Bringsjords Zombie Attack - Coursework Example

Bringsjord’s Zombie Attack Introduction The philosophical debate regarding existence forms of human rages on with philosophers never seeming to converge on a common ground in the topics involved. The debate extends to the scientific perceptions and determination of building artificial people, other wise known as computationalism, with the usual standoff style that philosophers use in evaluating such debates taking stage. Popular proponents in this debate include John Pollock and Daniel Dennett who support that the future will be able to manufacture artificial people who will have cognitive abilities similar to humans. On the contrary, Bringsjord opposes the debate by presenting several arguments that he states will prove that the project of building artificial people who he refers to as “zombies” will eventually crumble and fall, in addition to that never at one time shall an artificial creation equal or even outdo human thinking and cognitive ability. This text will provide an insight into Bringsjord’s counter-arguments to Dennett’s ideas of successful computationalism, or ability of robots to function exactly like humans, and thereafter evaluate the two arguments and give a personal supported opinion concerning the computationalism. Dennett (1994) argues that someday, robots will be made that will be able to function just like humans do. He states that the reason for this belief is that we as human being are also robots in a way. To him, human beings are able to do all the complex functions just because we can exercise self-control and come up with self-sustaining mechanisms that have been made by natural selection and guided by purely physical processes such as metabolism, reproduction, or self-repair. He admits that it is a wild ambition to imagine that a human replication can succeed in triumphing over nature by creating an artificial human, but however says it is not an unachievable task. The main point of his argument is based on his perspective that a conscious machine is in no way different from a perpetual one in that both can be programmed to execute specific functions by use of physical processes. The only constriction that [his] project would encounter is the expensive costs of assembling billions of minute mechanisms to direct the robots’ actions. To better understand Dennett’s stand, it is important to highlight some factors that might qualify robots as zombies or just mechanical creations lacking consciousness; 1. First of all, a robot is a purely material thing whereas it is commonsense that consciousness requires immaterialism to exist, a theory of dualism. 2. Secondly, a robot is an inorganic creation whereas consciousness can only exist in a brain, which is organic in nature. 3. Thirdly, robots are artificial, and consciousness cannot be created, because it is more of inborn than it is manufactured. 4. Fourth, robots can never posses as many systems as a human being, as such; they will always be simple in a way that cannot support consciousness. When most of us would quit the debate at that information, Dennett has arguments that push one into a dilemma, or rather, he argues that robots can, and will one day reason and function like humans. He gives the following explanations to counter the above four mentioned attributes; a) For the first attribute, he defines the notion of “immaterial stuff” as mere superstition since all body processes are today defined and explained and understood through biology. Why then, he asks, should understanding and creating a mechanism similar to the brain be impossible? b) On the second, he argues that organic processes can be alternated by biochemical processes to enable a robot to do what an organic process in the brain can do. c) On the third issue of robots being artificial thus not conscious, Dennett says that if a person is broken up into individual atoms, then it is possible to make a duplicate of that person. The consciousness does not have to be inborn but rather acquired as the person or robots encounters experience. d) On the fourth note of robots being too simple with fewer abilities due to lack of the trillions of parts as in human beings, Dennett says that it is possible for a robot to work like a human, but only if all the trillions of circuits can be incorporated into it. With these parts in place, a robot will be similar to a human being, and be able to execute all the actions that a human can. To support the above arguments, he introduces the “Cog Project” in which scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are using humanoid robotic knowledge to give the cog, which is a robot, human-level intelligence. They use the concept that if a robot is created and is exposed to human interaction, then it can gain intelligence the same way that babies do. It responds to surrounding stimuli by using knowledge acquired from imitating humans, together with their corresponding responses to the stimuli. The aim of this project is to design a humanoid robot that can communicate with both humans and robots, to act as a mediator. The robot uses sensors and motors to replace mechanical and visual proprioceptions. In place of the organic processes, the cog robot uses complex materials and designs that work with artificial chemicals and organic forms. So far, it has a human-like face, exhibits several motor freedoms, hears, touches, and responds to several conditions using its sensory input mechanisms. Bringsjord uses John Searle’s argument who is an arch-attacker of the person building project, an issue that has placed him in a clash with Dennett, who largely supports the project. Searle’s attack is based on a common thought by philosophers that recognize that the human brain is prone to deterioration with time, a condition that doctors can replace with silicon chips. Philosophers in addition have it in mind that the replacement of the brain continues until the whole brain is gone and in its place are only silicon chips remaining. According to Searle, this procedure can result in three scenarios… 1. First, the silicon fillings work magic in that they enable execution of the same mental and sensorimotor functions as the flesh and blood brain. 2. Second, continued refilling with the silicon chips means the brain’s area of conscious experience reduces gradually but does not affect one’s external behavior. Rather, it affects one’s conscious experience as a result of the shrinking. 3. Finally, the replacements might result in one getting paralyzed thus abandonment by doctors and finally death. Searle extracts his argument from the second possibility, commonly referred to as the “zombie variation”. In his own words, he explains that the replacements result in depletion of the middle relationship between the behavior patterns and the mind. In that scenario, the chips are unable to execute the brain’s mandate of producing conscious mental states. In short, the three scenarios tell us something about the brain. One, the brain is responsible for all conscious (mental) phenomena. Second, there is a logical or conceptual relationship between external behavior and mental phenomenon. Lastly, we learn that the ability of the human brain to cause consciousness is overly distinct from its ability to cause motor behaviors. In short, a system can have behavior without consciousness and consciousness without behavior. Concisely, Searle describes Dennett’s proposal of robots being able to challenge the human mind as an impossible task even in future. He refers to his “artificial people” as mere “machines with minds”, maintaining his ground that robots will always be machines and never people, and no matter what extent of artificial intelligence is installed in them, they can never match human intelligence but will be have successfully achieved “zombie” status. Zombies have bodies like humans, yes, but they have no thinking (consciousness), thus are far inferior in comparison to us (Bringsjord, 2001). The evidence provided by both articles is quite convincing, as each point shot by the rivals has some sense that keeps one swinging from opposing to proposing, back and forth. Dennett’s argument really comes close to convince one that an artificial person is a possible project especially using his concept of breaking up a person into the very last atom then copying the assembling of the small parts to create a similar “person” in the process. He even comes out stronger to say that the brain which is the centre or control point of the body is able to execute its task by the use of chemical variations and that this can be applied to the artificial people if scientists can use artificial biochemistry to copy the effects. I tend to agree with Bringsjord who through Searle’s concepts appears stronger than him in opposing the success in creating artificial people. His strongest point is that a mind is what differentiates between people in life, and that it uses much more than just pre-installed physical properties in achieving its intelligent nature. In addition, the opposition states that while creating the external human form is very possible, it would take all eternity to install the trillion parts of humans into the now zombies to convert them to creatures with full control and response of themselves. In my opinion, Bringsjord is more realistic as he provides evidence that satisfies all queries that might arise from the debate unlike Dennett, bearing in mind that artificial people do not exist yet, thus his evidence is not yet proven. References Bringsjord, S. (2001, August 27). The zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind: Department of Philosophy, Psychology & Cognitive Science: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Dennett, D. (1994, September 1-3). Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds. IIAS Symposium on Cognition, Computation and Consciousness. Read More