Euthyphro Dilemma and the Concept of Divine Piety - Essay Example

EUTHYPHRO’S DILEMMA AND THE CONCEPT OF DIVINE PIETY Understanding the Euthyphro Dilemma: An Overview The study of philosophy is rife with religious, theoretical and ethical contradictions, particularly in the realm of religious theory, pertaining to the interrelated issues of passion, piety, goodness, godliness and the related dialectical notions, concerning the long debated questions of monotheism vis-à-vis polytheism. Among the most prominent ancient philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are the stalwarts of the Enlightenment epistemic traditions of intricate debates on religious, ethical and political theorisations, which centre on and around several of these topics. In this context, I wish to focus on the issue of Euthyphro’s Dilemma, as conceived by Socrates and recorded by Plato in his Dialogues, and examine it as a central trope in the ancient philosophical rhetoric and theoretical paradigms; for, it stands at the heart of the contradictions within the theistic notion of “divine- command morality” as human duty. (Chappell) A brief overview of the Euthyphro Dilemma as depicted by Plato informs us of the skepticism of Socrates, who was confronted by Euthyphro, a conscientious believer, attempts to unravel the inherent contradiction in all things moral and matters of divine by setting forth a confounding riddle: “Is what is good good because god wills it? Or does god will it because it is good?” Euthyphro, who was an adherent of the divine-command theory, fails to resolve the internal dialectical divide between the two given premises. He refuses to accept the first premise on the grounds of the arbitrariness of the nature of the said “good” in that it precedes god’s act of “willing” it. The idea that goodness can exist independently of the divine will and command becomes a stark contradiction to his belief system that rests upon a strong religious faith on the Divine. The second premise he refutes because the nature of goodness is predetermined, in essence the ethical morality of man determines the nature of goodness, before the issue of religious morality can enter the picture. (Chappell) The sovereignty of god does not, cannot and should not determine the tract of human morality, which is innate and instinctive, harking back to the innocence and purity of humankind before the biblical Fall from Eden. Framing the Issue: The Problem of Faith These self-contradictions that lie within the religious and philosophical foregrounding of faith, piety and holiness recur, repeatedly, in such academic attempts to underline and highlight the true nature of theistic knowledge and belief systems. Students, theorists and researchers of normative ethics often encounter the Euthyphro dilemma in their studies on the affective capacities and the over-all empirical and philosophical intelligibility of the dive-command theories of religion. (Warne 69) Several academicians try to utilise the nugatory implications of the said stance to devalue and de-emphasise the traditional conception of divinity and piety. Socrates may be said to occupy a position of central importance in terms of his enquiry into the effect and importance of the divine command theory vis-à-vis human life and goodness. The Euthyphro Dilemma is an astounding instance of such a contrary state of human mind, where the two strands of faith - moral and divine – remain suspended in a state of perpetual indecision and non-resolution. In this essay, I wish to focus on a critique of Socrates’ skepticism by presenting a cohesive and philosophical sound argument in favour of an all-pervasive, unified vision of faith and the universal nature of piety. The transition from a polytheistic context to a monotheistic religious vision is integral in the intended resolution of the dilemma. Thus, my primary intent is the integration of the varied strands of belief and value systems that create intricate and confusing mazes of related metaphors and expressions of piety, morality and divinity within the context of a polytheistic socio-cultural setting into a monotheistic vision of a grand, unified philosophical tradition that accounts for these diverse connotations of faith. The Nature and Conception of Piety: Socratic Theory and Beyond Christopher Warne aptly claims that, “Socrates is a detectivist about value”. (Warne 69) This is, indeed, the defining element behind Socrates’ insistent search for the meaning rather than the mere source of human virtue and piety. Euthyphro, on the hand, is concisely labeled as a “projectivist”. (69) The underlying difference between these two philosophical stances lies in their divergent perceptions of faith. Socrates sees piety as self-affirming only if it conforms to the objective truths about piety that are independent of subjective biases and affiliations – religious or ethical. Euthyphro, on the other hand, that the human subjective judgment about the notion and conception of piety, directly or indirectly, constitutes the ideal version of the same. A historical contextualization of the Socrates- Euthyphro debate, occurring around 399 B.C, further helps to illustrate this philosophical contradiction. Euthyphro had brought a charge of murder against his own father (who was apparently guilty of inadvertently letting a worker die from carelessness and neglect) to the king’s court, where Socrates was on trial for contravening the state’s religious decree and decorum, and was suspected of ‘impiety’ – a crime of quite significant proportions. (Tewari 41) The surety of the formers pious and ethical convictions on the nature of goodness and evil, the pious and the impious prompted Socrates to pose the aforementioned conundrum to the proclaimed master of religious philosophy and ethics. It is interesting to note that the charge of impiety laid against Socrates centered on his worshipping ‘false gods’, that is, deities who were not sanctioned by the religious institutions and the state. (Palmer 232) The ambiguity about the nature of holiness and goodness, therefore, pervaded Socrates’ enraged consciousness. The ‘detectivist’ philosopher within him was clamouring for an answer to this harrowing question – what, indeed, is the true nature of piety? Euthyphro attempted to present a series of defining statements to elucidate the nature of the abstract, fleeting concept, without being able to satisfy his imperious and inquisitive opponent. He variously tried to explain piety as something that has the eternal sanction and approval of the gods. “What is Pleasing to the Gods is holy, and what is not pleasing to them is unholy.” (Palmer 233) While this definition was, to some extents, accepted by Socrates, he further laid the proposition that, since there is a long tradition of religious texts telling us about internal disputes, enmities and wars among the gods, how could there be a single, coherent definition of what may be termed ‘pious’ or ‘holy’? What if the gods both variously and differently agree and disagree upon the piety of a particular act? This would, then, give rise to a state of logical impasse wherein the question would remain unresolved. Euthyphro, in response to this objection, modified his former answer and said that an action is pious or impious when all gods unanimously agree upon it. At this stage of the debate, Socrates raised his famous, critical issue that, since the Platonic times, gained currency as Euthyphro’s dilemma, as quoted in the earlier sections. (Tewari 43) However, in order to resolve the interwoven strands of the Socratic debate, it is important to note that the central ethos of Euthyphro’s proposed definition of the ‘holy’ and the ‘good’ lies within the multiple dimensions of piety. As Plato relates in Euthyphro a lucid definition would adequately explain the interrelated facets of the terms in three explicit ways. (Jones 385) The formal conditions are listed in quite simple terms by Rabbas as well as Russell Jones in their studies on the issue of virtue, faith and religion in the context of the Platonic and Socratic theories vis-à-vis the Euthyphro’s Dilemma. The definition must subsume within its category and purview all the diverse kinds, instances and actions of piety within itself. Therefore, it must be, foremost, unified in its conception and reach. The second condition may be said to state that as a defining statement, it must serve as a model, a set standard against which all future actions will be measured, to adequately and qualitatively, define their adherence to the rule of piety and holiness. Thus, an action can be said to be pious or holy only if it measures up to the standard or model of piety as set in the proposed definition. Thirdly, and most importantly, the definition must be explicative and explanatory about the essential nature and ethos of piety or goodness. (Jones 385) While, as it has been pertinently pointed out by Rabbas, no proposed definition of Euthyphro has successfully fulfilled all these requirements and conditions, it must be kept and mind that both Socrates and Euthyphro were grappling with an issue that had too many interfering variables clouding its basic premises. In short, the polytheistic brand o religion followed by these two Greek philosophers was the primary deterring factor in establishing a cohesive and coherent ideal of justified piety. A Response to the Ethyphro’s Dilemma: From Polytheism to Monotheism A critique of the conception of piety as per the Socratic tradition necessarily involves a deeper and meaningful appropriation and understanding of the same in terms of a philosophical backdrop that affords a kind of clarity and cohesion that is lacking in the involved and confounding rhetoric of the Socratic religious theory. The polytheistic religious affiliation of the ancient Greece and Greek philosophy is partially to blame here. Socrates’ major premise for refutation of Euthyphro’s notion of piety as a code of conduct as agreed upon by divine command lies mainly in his conception of multiple gods with their own particular subjection notions of what is right and what is not. The lack of coherence and the numerous logical and philosophical inconsistencies within the concept and nature of holiness, divine command and piety arises mainly out of the fixed assumption of multiple and conflicting sources of divine authorities. The problem of inconsistency can be removed successfully when the argument in shifted to a monotheistic ground and belief system. The conversion from the idea of many gods to one, single source of divine power automatically negates the idea of inherent and internal conflicts regarding the idea of faith and piety, thereby facilitating a unified vision and understanding of the same. In addition, the Euthyphro’s dilemma has neglected to consider another vital facet of the divine theory. While the two premises posited by Socrates are logically valid, it fails to provide a third alternative. The monotheistic idea of a single, benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent positive force automatically accounts for the inherent piety and holiness in the divine-command theory. The biblical idea of God’s grace and his innate goodness automatically renders any suspicion about the validity and acceptability of what He considers to be good moot. Simply put, since God is good, what he believes to be good must be so. The justification of piety in Christian, monotheistic terms thus successfully resolves the contentious dialectics of the Euthyphro’s Dilemma. Conclusion The questions of representation become vital in this context and can also become a probable cause for logical contention against this entire argument. It must be remembered that the entire episode spanning Euthyphro and Socrates is known and read only as it has come to represented in Plato’s Dialogues. The representational accuracy of the debate and the historical exchange between the two is, at time, tangentially called into question by critics like Elinor JM West. She has openly considered a possibility of miscommunication between the two men. (West 150) Further, the incongruity between the two respondents must also be examined. The irony of Socrates is at stark contrast to the serious conscientiousness and gives credence to West’s assumption of a conversational gap and misunderstanding. Furthermore, the major flaw in the Socratic argument lies in the fact that Socrates is primarily a logician and his argumentation in the debate follows the epistemic and rhetorical tradition of logical flow of successive premises and their following conclusion. The strictly rule-bound, almost mathematical exploration of an ethical, philosophical question automatically leaves certain gaps and loopholes in the process. However, since our discussion is primarily based on the Platonic record of history, albeit a re-imagined version of history, the assumption of its historicity and accuracy must be considered valid for the sake of logical coherence. References: Jones, Russell E. "Piety as a Virtue in the Euthyphro." Ancient Philosophy 26.2 (2006): 385-390. Tewari, Arun K. Socrates. New Delhi: Ocean Books, 2009. Print. Warne, Christopher. Arguing with Socrates: An Introduction to Plato’s Shorter Dialogues. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. Print. West, Elinor JM. "An ironic dilemma, or incompatible interpretations of Euthyphro". Platos Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations. Eds. Gerald Alan Press, Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (1993): 147-168. Chappell, Timothy. "Euthyphro Dilemma, Socrates’ Daimonion and Plato’s God." God, Goodness and Philosophy. Ed. Harriet A. Harris. Ashgate Publishing: UK, 2013. Print. Palmer, Michael F. The Question of God: An Introduction and Sourcebook. Routledge: London, 2001. Print. Read More