Using Falsification in Philosophy - Assignment Example

Using Falsification in Philosophy From the earlier days, science and philosophy have always worked hand in hand trying to uncover unknown truths about the universe. Both subjects are necessary for the knowledge advancement and also the advancement of the humanity. As such, scientists are mandated with designing experiments whereby they try to obtain results to verify of disapprove a given hypothesis. On the other hand, philosophers are viewed as the driving force in the determination of the factors that will determine the validity of the scientific experiment. Often, philosophers determine the nature of science itself and also influence the direction taken by a viable research. Therefore, it appears that as one theory gets falsified, another one evolves as a replacement and act as an explanation for the new observation. A major theme that lies behind science is that any scientific hypothesis and its experiments are inherently falsifiable. Despite falsifiability not being accepted universally, it is seen as the foundation of the majority of scientific experiments. This means that in as much as many scholars may doubt it, it is a major block in the acceptability of any scientific projects. An experiment has to be falsified for it to be accepted as true. Hence, falsifiability is seen as the belief that for a given hypothesis to be approved, it must be inherently rejected before it is scientifically accepted as a scientific theory or hypothesis. Karl Popper, one f the earlier philosophers tried to solve the problem of induction by using falsification. According to Popper, empirical sciences can be characterized by a fact that they make use of inductive methods. This means that the logic of scientific discoveries would be identical with inductive logic. He also states that the question of whether inductive inferences are justified or under what conditions is referred to as the problem of induction. Thus, this problem of induction, he writes can be formulated as the question of how one can establish the truth of universal statements that are based on experiences. This was because many people believed the truth of any of the universal statements “known by experience” and yet it was clear that an account of an experiment or an observation could in the first place have been only a singular statement and not universal one (Popper, 426-427). This was meant to imply that if only a single individual gave an account, the probability of it being accepted was null until other people did the same experiment and gave their statement. Hence, the problem of induction has to be falsified for it to be accepted. Thus, from a singular experiment, the truth of universal experience could be reduced to the truth of singular ones since the singular ones are known by experience to be true. This paves the way for Popper to conclude that a universal statement is based on the inductive interference. Hence, questioning whether there is a law known to be true appears like is another version of asking if inductive interference is logically justified. Salmon also expands on Popper’s problem of induction. Salmon feels that Popper’s accounts of the scientific knowledge are based on generalization and observational tests. He affirms that by finding a bona fide counterexample to Popper’s generalization, one can say that the generalization has been deductively refuted (Salmon, 116-118). He states that to be sure like Popper was, difficulties must exist in some cases meant to determine whether certain observations have the genuine counterexamples to the given generalization. However, the process does not undermine the claim that genuine counterexamples result to deductive refutation. He gives the example from Popper that negative instances give rise to rational grounds for rejecting generalizations. At that point, Salmon believes that if observations or tests were done and that no negative instances were found, then one can deductively confirm that the generalization in question could not be refuted. Therefore, positive instances would not provide any confirmation or inductive support for any unrefuted generalization. This was supposed to mean that a generalization has to be falsified for it to be accepted. Salmon seems to disagree with Popper in matters concerning generalization. This is evidence where he writes that people have no basis for rational prediction. He claims that observation reports from past events contain no predictive content. Therefore, such observations indicate nothing about future events. On the contrary, if a general statement is taken as the premise and to it is conjoined some appropriate observational statements concerning the past or future, then one can deduce a conclusion that touches on the future occurrences and as such predictive content arrives. Ladyman agrees with Popper that scientific knowledge derives justification on the basis of generalization from experiences. As such, observations made from a variety of tests are recorded and then induction is used as a means of arriving at a general law. Ladyman believes that Popper’s view is attractive not because scientists have come to claim their practice through it but because it explains an alleged objectivity of the scientific knowledge by referring to open-mindedness of the scientists when they make the observations. It also keeps the scientific knowledge rooted in its experience. Also, Ladyman asserts that the problem of induction is an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume (Ladyman, 30-35). He writes that Hume related induction to the nature of causation and the laws of nature. To explain the problem of induction, Hume gives a distinction between two forms of a proposition; those concerning the relation of ideas and those that concern matters of fact. According to him, relations of ideas are the propositions whose content are confined to humans’ ideas or concepts. On the other hand, propositions concerning matters of fact are those that move beyond the nature of humans’ concepts and teach humans something informative concerning the actual world. Therefore, any true proposition concerning the relations among the ideas of humans is provided through deduction since the deduction’s negation implies a contradiction. On another note, Hume argued that the knowledge of matters of fact can only be derived from senses since the involved ideas are logically unrelated. Therefore, this means that the propositions are not deductively provable. In support of this idea, Hume gives an example of the proposition that Everest is the tallest mountain on earth. At this point, the concept that is involved is that of mountain, tallest, earth and some specific mountain in the Himalayas. According to Ladyman, all these concepts have no logical relation to each other that can determine the truth of the proposition and as such there exists no contradiction in supposing that another mountain could be the tallest (Ladyman, 32-36). From the example, Ladyman writes that it is impossible to find out if a proposition is true by mere reason but only by the use of sense can the truth of the proposition be investigated. The distinction given by Hume regarding matters of fact and relations of ideas corresponds roughly to Immanuel Kant’s distinction between the synthetic and the analytical truths. Hume claimed that all the reasoning that is beyond past and present experiences was usually based on cause and effects. The basis of induction, according to Hume is the causal relation connecting ideas that have no logical relation. As such, he believes that one can only obtain knowledge of the cause and the effect experienced since there are no contradictions in supposing that some particular causal relations do not hold. Hence, the knowledge of the matter of fact can be otherwise. Popper asserts that many branches of the applied sciences are not scientific for one reason; they cannot be falsified. For example, both anthropology and sociology observe people in their natural environment without testing for any specific hypothesis. As such, they do not qualify to be sciences since they cannot be falsified. According to Ladyman, such pseudo-scientific allegations are part of the contemporary scientific and political debate. He echoes the works of Popper by explaining the way Popper tried to work out the difference between theories he admired in physics and those that he thought were insufficient in both psychology and sociology. His conclusion was that part of the reason human beings thought that pseudo-sciences could be sciences was that they had mistaken the view about what made physics scientific. By this, he means that humans did not have the knowledge that for physics to be regarded as a science, it had to be tested by not just single individual but several and in the process was falsified. Hence, the main differentiating factor of social science and pure science is the falsification. Popper’s solution to the problem of induction, according to Ladyman is only to argue that it does not show that the scientific knowledge is not justified. The reason for the statement is that science does not depend on induction. According to Popper, there is a logical asymmetry between the confirmations and the falsification of any universal generalization (Ladyman, 65-68). Hence, the problem of induction arises because no matter the number of positive instances for a generalization are observed; there is still a possibility that the next instance is bound to falsify it. From the above discussion, it is clear that most of the authors agree with Popper on matters of generalization. For a scientific experiment to be acknowledged it has to be verified by several tests. This way, the test gets to be falsified and, therefore, gains access to the world of pure sciences. Going back to the earlier tests that were conducted by the earlier scientists, a test was only acknowledged if it was verified by another scientist. This brings to the problem of induction. Just like the example given regarding a child, humans can only understand the real meaning of a phenomenon if they are frequently exposed to that particular object. For example, a child can only learn to keep of hot stoves after experiencing several burns from that particular stove. Otherwise, the kid may not understand the dangers of getting closer to a hot stove. In the same way, a test cannot qualify to be pure science if it is not exposed to several tests and observations. The numerous tests and observations are comparable to induction. Therefore, Popper was right while he tried to solve the problem of induction through falsification. This is because when one tries to give the faults of any phenomenon, it is the same as inducing that problem. By trying to induce I mean one is trying to clear any doubt that may arise in the observation. Therefore, it is through induction that living things understand different situations and phenomena. Similarly, is through falsification that an observation becomes acceptable or rejected in the world of sciences. In conclusion, I think Popper succeeded in trying to falsify the problem of induction. Through the examples given in the discussion, it is clear that induction, just like falsification ends any doubts that might arise in any test. Therefore, in as much as some Marxist may try to refute Popper’s theory of falsification, the problem of induction will prove them wrong. Works Cited Ladyman, J. (2002). Understanding philosophy of science. United Kingdom: Psychology Press. Popper, K. (2005). The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Routledge Publishers. Salmon, W. C. (1981). Rational prediction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 115-125. Read More