Puppies, Pigs, and People eating meat and marginal cases - Essay Example

Puppies, Pigs and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases If one needed to torture puppies to enjoy a chocolate taste, would this be wrong? Obviously, the answer is yes, this is very wrong. However, most of those who would answer yes purchase factory farmed meat and consume it regularly, seeing no problem in this. The two scenarios may not be distinguishable morally, according to Alastair Norcross in his creative and provocative paper Puppies, Pigs and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases. He makes a case contending that the purchase and consumption of factory-farmed meat is comparable to the torturing of puppies in order to get gustatory pleasure, adding that meat-eaters who come to this realization may as well turn to vegetarians and give up factory-farmed meat. This argument is certainly food of thought. This paper is a discussion of two arguments based on the article, “Puppies, Pigs and People eating meat and marginal cases”. In his article, Norcross contends that there is no need for humans to continue consuming factory-farmed meat. He starts his article by giving an example of the fictional Fred and the quest for a chemical that will allow him to have the gustatory experience, akin to that of tasting chocolate. Unfortunately, Cocoamone can only be retrieved from the brain of an abused puppy following prolonged torture and an excruciating death. Just as one would condemn an individual who carries out this sort of treatment on puppies, so we should also condemn those who derive gustatory pleasure from the consumption of factory-farmed animals. The author gives some differences between Fred and an average consumer of meat, as well as possible defenses that one could use to justify their meat eating habits as being different to Fred’s fetish. He follows each of this method of reasoning with an objection. The first difference that he brings along has to do with the fact that Fred does the torturing himself while a majority of Americans consume meat from creatures tortured by others. His second difference is that most consumers are not aware of the treatment meted out on these animals before they get to the supermarket. His first defense of the carnivore is that even if the individual did not consume or buy the factory-farmed meat, the animals would not be spared a life of cruelty. Agri-business is a vast market and changes to the eating habits of one individual cannot cause much of a difference. This Norcross refers to as causal impotence; the belief that refraining from meat consumption does not alter the amount of suffering the animal experiences. He objects vehemently to this defense by offering an example of a chocolate mousse that has Cocoamone. Norcross argues that once a person is informed on the methods of attaining Cocoamone, a morally upright person would then not order for the mousse. Consequently, this should be similar for a morally upright person who is given information on the methods used to obtain factory-farmed meat. His second response is that while there is a tiny chance that one’s behavior is harmful, the harm that is risked is even extra harmful. A chance of one in a thousand to save two hundred and fifty chickens is the same as, the certainty of saving twenty-five chickens a year by a person electing not to consume chicken. Norcross continues to show an even more disturbing scenario where there is no change in breeding in the factories until ten thousand people turn to vegetarians. The faster the threshold is attained, the sooner the difference will be made; therefore, an individual’s behavior does result in a difference. The point of this fictional story is meant to raise a pertinent question; is Fred’s behavior really that different in a moral sense from the behavior of millions who buy and eat factory-sourced meat? Norcross does not think so and rejects various ways that could be used to distinguish the two. Relevant differences include the following: for any individual, who consumes factory-sourced meat, becoming a vegetarian will not prevent the suffering of animals, he or she cannot causally have an effect on the agribusiness. In addition, the suffering of farm-sourced animals is merely a side effect that is foreseen not intended to obtain gustatory pleasure. In Fred’s case, the suffering of the puppy is intended, as a way to attain pleasure. Finally, one could also argue that factory-sourced animals are not puppies. The attempted justification that will be taken seriously in this paper is that becoming a vegetarian will have no effect on animal suffering since an individual cannot causally affect the agribusiness. An individual who objects to Norcross’ contention could claim that different from Fred, he/she is causally impotent. Whileh Fred could easily prevent the suffering of the puppy by doing away with chocolate, he/she cannot prevent suffering to factory-sourced animals by becoming a vegetarian. Given the sheer size of the agribusiness industry, even if they quit buying factory-sourced meat, they would have zero effect on it and, as such, they might as well revel in animal flesh since their actions will have no difference. In response, Norcross denies this claim of causal impotence. Through giving up chicken an individual could make two types of differences. First, by giving chicken up, the individual may reach the threshold of 10,000. Although the odds of getting to prevent suffering may be tiny, they, nevertheless, have great significance with the stakes involved. Norcross uses an analogy - he imagines an airline that had knowingly allowed a plane to be airborne for one week without functioning emergency exits, lifejackets and oxygen masks. This would be outrageous even as the chances that people would rely on them in one week are smaller than a ten of a thousandth. Therefore, the idea that an individual could be the next one to reach the threshold does matter. Secondly, even if this individual does not become the next convert to reach this threshold, he allows this threshold to be reached faster. Because of the individual’s conversion, the number of chicken eaters ahead of him who need to give up eating chicken in order to reduce animal suffering decreases. Therefore, his behavior can make a difference. The other difference provided considers the Doctrine of Double Effect. In the case of Fred, puppy torture is intended to pleasure Fred while the suffering of factory-farmed animals is only foreseen as a system side effect that provides pleasure for millions (Norcross 234). Norcross responds to this by contending that proper use of defense not only needs the effects be foreseen sans intention, but that they also have outweighing good effect that should be considered. He says that no such good effect exists and that even one changes their example that involves Fred so that we can foresee the suffering, their behavior and consequent acts of puppy killing is not any less barbaric. The last difference Norcross deals with, involves the higher moral status provided to domesticated animal breeds and dogs, as opposed to animals bred for consumption. If it can be argued that dogs are more rational and intelligent than chicken, then this is easy agree to, but if compared to animals like pigs, the line becomes less distinguishable. He argues that there is little likelihood that any property could be seen as ethically relevant to puppies that are not to farm animals. In addition, Norcross contends that even if one were to eat farm animals lacking in rationale and intelligence, it would still not be okay to eat less intelligent puppies and humans. Norcross concludes that by looking at human sympathy given to some animals and denied to others, for example, how cat and dog eaters in S. Korea are not sufficiently sensitive, as well as how humane farming proponents in the U.S. and Britain are over-sensitive. Norcross argues that no easy explanation to the correct degree of moral sensibility exists and that the variation in behavior between one who eats meat and Fred is simple psychology. There is much more that can be said concerning the arguments that Norcross makes in his paper, this paper has strived to show that it is hard to deny the fact that eating factory-sourced meat and the torturing of puppies for gustatory pleasure are morally equivalent. Works Cited Norcross, Alastair. "Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases." Philosophical Perspectives (2004): 230-245. Print . Read More