Bertrand Russells criticism of direct realism - Essay Example

Bertrand Russell’s criticism of direct realism Introduction It would not be a mistake to suggest that one of the major differences between human beings and the rest of the living world can be seen in the fact that people question every aspect of their lives. Indeed, animals accept the world as it is, but the mankind has been thinking about fundamental questions almost since its very beginning. That is why to a certain extent philosophy reflects this essential part of the human nature. This paper will examine ideas of one of such philosophers, namely Bertrand Russell, and his criticism of direct realism, proving that he makes both strong and weak arguments against it. In order to do so, the analysis will include a brief explanation of the position that is argued by the philosopher in question as well as evaluation of the arguments that he makes. Russell’s position To begin with, it may be important to highlight several important aspects of the view which was developed by Bertrand Russell. Thus, he questions whether there is some kind of knowledge that everyone would agree on. He concludes that the knowledge about the objects that exist in reality can be such knowledge as two people who walk into the same room would see in the similar manner. However, that is exactly the kind of approach that he wants to criticism, suggesting that the knowledge that he was of the ordinary objects (he particularly focuses on the example of the table) is, in fact, relative. Russell points out that the perception of a physical object is largely conditioned by the state of the observer; for example the color of the table will change based on the angle of view (Ongley and Carey 132). The same can be said about texture shape and so on. Keeping in mind that all these states exist simultaneously, he argues that it is not logical to talk about the “real” color or shape of the table. The philosopher in question then moves to the issue of norm in terms of determining properties of the object. Having established that the color can be bright (under direct sunlight), moderate (under artificial light) and invisible (if perceived in the darkness), Russell notes that most people would agree that the “real” color is the one found in the second case. However, in his view this leads to “favoritism” that can hardly be justified since it is grounded on such vague assumptions as “normal spectator … an ordinary point of view … usual conditions of light” (Feinberg 193). Finally, Russell concludes that there should be a distinction made between sense data, sensations and physical objects. The first is the kind of information that people receive with the help of their senses; the second is the experience of processing this data; the third is something that is thought to be the origin of the first (Griffin 30). However, the philosopher disputes that the relationship between sense data and reality is firm. For example, he admits that if he leaves a room and stop seeing the table, the table would not cease to exist since it can be seen by other people in the meantime. However, this might mean that the existence of table is dependent on its ability to be seen. Since tables do not disappear in a room when nobody is looking at them, it is quite possible that the collective perception of the universe does not allow them to disappear. In any case, the connection between the reality and appearance should be questioned. Strong points that Russell makes I believe that the strongest argument that the philosopher in question makes focuses on the relationship between state of the observer and the object that is being observed. First of all, it is quite understandable that all the examples that he mentioned (in case of color: seeing a table from far away, looking closely and using a microscope) are possible and real (Banks 96). In other words, he does not want people to image seeing a table in ultraviolet spectrum. So, this is rather convincing. In addition to that, every new state of the observer changes the perception of the object dramatically (Irvine 55). Indeed, Russell notes that a table that is seen from far away can appear to be a tiny object. However, the same table if looked upon through the microscope will appear to be huge. In addition to that it will reveal almost a new world that is fully of cracks and valleys, urging the observer to change the perception of the object from a more or less unified to a complex one. Finally, the states that Russell employs in his analysis are permanent. While, of course, it is rather difficult to image a person who will be examining a table with a microscope during all one’s life, but the major point here is that the table actually exists in all these new dimensions. In other words, neither of the points of view is temporary which contributes to the possibility of perceiving the table from it forever. Weak points that Russell makes Closer to the end of the chapter the philosopher in question admits that while different scholars would look at the issue of the table in a different way, they are likely to agree that the table exists. In other words, no matter what perceptions they adhere to, they would also accept the fact that the physical object produces sense dat. With this in mind, it becomes obvious that since everyone agrees on the reality of the object, then everyone would agree on a single color for it. In other words, it is true that there is a choice of three (as in the example made by Russell), but for convenience of communication and understanding the world, people would agree on one since that makes sense. Therefore, the call of Russell to doubt the existence of reality should be dismissed. In addition to that, the end of the chapter seems to be quite far from its beginning. In other words, the original question was to find a kind of knowledge that everyone would agree on, but the philosopher seems to be looking for answer to a different question. Therefore, in order to keep the discussion straight, he should return to examination original problem. In addition to that, the logical outcome of Russell’s considerations urges people to doubt many fundamental facts that they take for granted. Indeed, this approach may be useful if a person wants to develop an objective and unbiased understanding of a particular project, but the perspective that is advocated by Russell is too broad and, therefore, it is hardly useful. Indeed, if people doubt the relationship between sense data and physical objects this would lead to a complete re-evaluation of the entire array of knowledge that was collected by the people so far. Conclusion Having examined all the points that were mentioned in the paragraphs above, one is able to come to the following conclusion: the criticism of direct realism which is expressed by Bertrand Russell in his chapter that is titled Appearance and Reality presents a peculiar perspective on the issue. The author seems to be makes many interesting points out the objective reality, suggesting that it may be important to perceive it through framework that is composed of such terms as “physical object”, “sense data” and “sensation”. The strong argument that he makes focuses on the dependence of properties of an object on the state of the observer. However, I find his argument about necessity to avoid favoritism of points of view to be a week one. Works Cited Banks, Erik C. The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014. Print. Feinberg, Joel. Reason and Responsibility;. Belmont, CA: Dickenson Pub., 2013. Print. Griffin, Nicholas. The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. Print. Irvine, Andrew D. Language, Knowledge and the World. London: Routledge, 1999. Print. Ongley, John, and Rosalind Carey. Russell: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum, 2013. Print. Read More