PLO and Hamas achieved the Palestinian national aspiration - Research Paper Example

To what extent did PLO and Hamas achieved the Palestinian national aspiration? Introduction A forceful radical protest regarding national aspirations and measures as well as moral and social principles characterized Hamas’s appearance into the limelight of Palestinian politics. Hamas, a short form of Harakat al-Muqawama al Islamiyya (Islamic resistance movement), surfaced as an Islamic back-up or substitute to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with the eruption of the Intifada-- the revolution of Palestinians against the Israeli invasion.1 Hamas questioned the position of the PLO as the only rightful representative of the Palestinian national aspiration and the Palestinian people, as the absolute political force, and, eventually, the Palestinian Authority (PA) founded in the Gaza Strip. This research paper argues that Hamas and the PLO are inherently irreconcilable in terms of objective, ideology, leadership, foreign policy, and relationship with Israel. Furthermore, this paper tries to prove that both Hamas and the PLO failed to realize their national aspirations because of such internal conflict. The successes of each movement are largely derived from taking advantage of the weaknesses of the other. The author chose this topic because of her interest in the differences between Hamas and the PLO and the reasons why two fundamentally similar national movements became fierce rivals. Furthermore, it is important to understand how these two organizations tried to realize their national aspirations in order to determine how to best resolve their internal conflict. Hamas challenged PLO’s political agenda for Palestinian national territory and secular nationalism, in effect taking over the original Palestinian national aspiration, traditionally associated with the PLO, and situating them in an Islamic perspective. By appealing to an Islamic national aspiration, Hamas successfully merged everyday issues and religious dogma.2 A conflict, growing over time, between Hamas, the PLO, and particularly Fatah, has continuously disrupted the realization of the Palestinian national goals of these organizations. Hamas firmly declined the proposals of Fatah and the PLO, wanting instead to build and legitimize itself as a political substitute. The conflict between the PLO and Hamas reached its climax during the alleged Madrid process—a chain of bilateral compromises between those with territorial demands and Israel.3 However, Hamas’s doctrine recognizes the PLO as an “ally, father, brother, relative, friend”4 and Hamas prevented a military conflict with Fatah in the past. Hamas, under the headship of Sheikh Yasin, firmly condemned internal strife between Palestinian political groups for this would merely strengthen the position of Israel and undermine the Palestinian national aspiration.5 From the very beginning, Hamas was unsure about the PLO, expressing, on the one hand, allegiance to its political autonomy and ideological identity and, on the other, a concern for coexistence.6 The effort of Hamas to sustain a harmonious relationship with the PLO, and eventually with the PA, revealed its political flaw with regards to the rising local, regional, and global support for the peace process between the PLO and Israel.7 It was this idea of the weakness of its status that pushed Hamas to attempt to build an agreement with the PLO that would provide it with the opportunity to strengthen its capability and influence and boost its ranks. Moreover, its pursuit of organizational autonomy and identity encouraged Hamas to look for ways to frustrate the move of PLO toward suppression and hegemony. Literature Review The references used in this paper are both primary and secondary. The author used textbooks, peer-reviewed journal articles, newspapers, and magazines. The best primary references that are used in this paper are Mkhaimar Abusada’s Palestinian Party Affiliation and Political Attitudes toward the Peace Process, Omri Arens’s and Edward Kaufman’s The Potential Impact of Palestinian Nonviolent Struggle on Israel: Preliminary Lessons and Projections for the Future, and Savera Kalideen’s & Haidar Eid’s A One State Solution for the Palestine-Israel Conflict: An Interview with Ali Abunimah. The main reason why these primary references are the finest is because of the fact that the authors are Palestinians themselves, except for Edward Kaufman, who have witnessed and experienced first-hand the Palestinian struggle in Israel, particularly the conflict between Hamas and the PLO. Mkhaimar Abusada himself has seen the development of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the armed conflict between the two factions. Because of his first-hand knowledge of the issue he is able to compellingly discuss the effect of political party membership on the perception of the Palestinian people of the peace negotiations. Similarly, Omri Aren and Edward Kaufman provide a first-hand account of the conflict between Hamas and the PLO and the possibility of reconciliation in the foreseeable future. And ultimately, the article of Savera Kalideen and Haidar Eid presents an interesting interview with Ali Abunimah, a Palestinian whose parents took flight on 1948, regarding how a two-state solution—a Palestinian state and an Israeli state—aggravates the conflict between Hamas and the PLO. The fact that these articles are published in New York does not weaken their reliability as first-hand accounts of the Palestine-Israeli conflict. For the secondary references, the best are Jamil Hilal’s Where Now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two State Solutions, Shaul Mishal’s and Avraham Sela’s The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, and Bassam Abu Sharif’s Arafat and the Dream of Palestine: An Insider’s Account. These authors present a comprehensive and in-depth interpretation and analysis of the reasons underlying the conflict between Hamas and the PLO. These authors also provide an impartial, unbiased view of the Palestine-Israeli conflict, as well as the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the objectives, ideology, and strategies of Hamas and the PLO. Bassam Abu Sharif’s book, specifically, is a gripping account of the historical struggle between Israel and Palestine, and how the relationship between Hamas and the PLO influences the Palestinian people’s attitude toward the larger Palestinian national aspiration. It combines the first-hand experiences of two of the most prominent figures in Palestine, Yaser Arafat and the author himself, Abu Sharif. History of the PLO and Hamas The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in Jerusalem in 1964.8 It was established due to several reasons, such as the expansion of covert, autonomous Palestinian nationalist movement, which Arab states tried to obstruct; the growing conflict between Israel and the Arab countries over water development plans and other issues; and the increasing importance of the Palestine issue in inter-Arab political affairs.9 The PLO immediately became the ground for numerous nationalist campaigns, which were more and more oriented toward attaining autonomy of political activity from the Arab states, besides the major aspiration to liberate Palestine and guarantee the return of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees.10 After the war of 1967, and the accompanying damage to the reputation of Arab states, supervision of the PLO was taken over by autonomous Palestinian political organizations with a more revolutionary agenda than that of the original organizers. These groups have governed the PLO from then on. Fatah, which means ‘conquest’ or ‘liberation’, is the biggest group within the PLO, and the Syrian division headed by Yasir Arafat.11 It became increasingly radical as Israel continuously achieved military success, and more uncompromising about returning territories seized from the Arabs. Even more radical factions formed within the PLO, such as the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Black September. These factions argued that the best way to force Israel to hand back the occupied territories was through terrorist activities.12 The Islamic Resistance Movement, or, Hamas, was the offspring of the intifada, which signified the onset of the real political resurgence of the Islamic forces in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Hamas was established in 1987 as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, a political and religious group formed in 1928 in Egypt.13 The primary objective of Hamas is to build an Islamic state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This objective merges Palestinian national aspiration and Islamist principles. Their ideology is precise on this issue: “Hamas regards nationalism as part and parcel of the religious faith. Nothing is loftier or deeper in nationalism than waging Jihad against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the Muslims.”14 The Muslim Brotherhood, the key Islamic movement in the invaded lands, had recoiled from forceful opposition against the Israeli invasion, a move that hindered its absolute progress as a major force. This state of affairs abruptly changed with the spate of Palestinian revolts, which pushed the Muslim Brotherhood to fulfill a dynamic part in the opposition for the first time.15 It fulfilled this role through Hamas. It was hence that the Islamic struggle, after decades of existence, successfully surfaced as the first real defiance ever initiated in the invaded lands. Hamas eventually surpassed the Muslim Brotherhood, with an enormity that resembles that of Fatah. Its establishment has generated fierce power struggles among political organizations that had held power for many years.16 Furthermore, the growing competition between the PLO’s secular national aspiration and Hamas’s Islamic philosophy may not end even in case the Israeli occupation comes to an end, because what is at issue is the identity and future of the Palestinian people. Conflicting Points The conflict between PLO and Hamas is primarily rooted in their ideology, leadership, foreign policy, and relation with Israel. The key ideology motivating Hamas is extremist Islam. Extremist Islam is a utopian, visionary, and expansionist principle that generally rationalizes bloodshed and hostility on behalf of what is widely considered a nonviolent religion.17 Islamists also aspire for a unified Islamic state, led by a caliph, which would eventually govern the entire world. The holy war, or Jihad, is commonly believed to be the only way to realize these goals.18 Moreover, Islamists generally condemned the power of the West and even the authority of their secular regimes for being submissive to Western powers. The elimination of these Western-style governments eventually became an important component of the Islamist objective.19 Such cynical perception of secular governments was without a doubt the manner within which Hamas perceived the PLO, the Fatah, and the PA. Both the Fatah and PA had traditionally undertaken diplomatic transactions with the U.S. and even took part in dialogues with Israel concerning nonviolent resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian strife.20 The idea of conferring with Israel, a Jewish nation that Hamas views as a usurper of Muslim territories, has placed the PA and Fatah on the enemy list of Hamas. Within Gaza and the West Bank, the sole ideology that can rival the Islamist philosophy of Hamas is secular Palestinian national aspiration. This ideology is driven by the reasonable and rightful aspiration of the Palestinian people to build a polity with established and legitimate borders.21 Even though there is definitely nothing innately perilous about a people who desire to occupy the territory they believe is their historic native soil, nationalism has been the root of numerous hostilities and wars all over the world. Alongside irredentism and racial intolerance, nationalism can become as perilous as all other revolutionary ideologies. In its contemporary manifestation, as largely articulated by the PLO and Fatah, the philosophy of Palestinian nationalism usually satisfies these conditions. In spite of the fact that the PA, a semi-government peopled mostly by members of Fatah, is generally considered a neutral group within Palestinian politics, both the PA and Fatah have supported quite a few violent activities over the years.22 Since the mid-20th century, Palestinian nationalism has been rooted more in annihilation of a Jewish nation than building its own polity. Yasir Arafat hurled Palestinian nationalism into the global arena with astounding terrorist assaults against Israeli enemies.23 Arafat was a self-proclaimed activist who targeted Israel while also campaigning against it through different political means. The PLO became the paramount prototype for terrorist operations in the contemporary period.24 It may be argued that bloodshed for the sake of Palestinian nationalism has resulted in the devastation and fatalities in almost all the territories that the Palestinians have occupied in their pursuit of a nation. For instance, in the 1970s, the Fatah-supported PLO tried to seize control over Jordan. The outcome was Black September, a large-scale battle that led to the death of a huge number of Palestinians and the reappearance of a liberated Jordan.25 The PLO and Fatah afterward tried to build a mini-state in Lebanon, which further incited a chaotic civil conflict. Incapable of confronting the attacks from the north, Israel marched into Lebanon and the Palestinian people were compelled to take flight again.26 Ultimately, after years of banishment in Tunisia, the PLO moved down to Gaza and the West Bank after the ratification of the Oslo Accords between Palestinians and Israel in 1993. From then on, the two provinces have plunged into absolute chaos, reaching its climax in the vicious Hamas invasion of the Gaza Strip and the civil war in 2007.27 In terms of leadership, the rivalry between the PLO and Hamas to mobilize the Palestinian people through structured protests and civil defiance intensified the enmity in their relationship. The PLO was particularly troubled by the rising popularity of Hamas, its autonomous judgment to punish traitors, and its decision to designate different dates for protests, which looked like a challenge to the power of the PLO embodied by the United National Command (UNC)— established by the PLO to carry out general regulation of the civil disobedience.28 Despite the successes of Hamas, it could not ignore the demand of the PLO to join the larger Palestinian national organization as an independent group. In what was perhaps a ruse to frustrate the plan, Hamas appealed to the Palestine National Council (PNC)—the PLO’s legislative branch—to join the PLO in 1990.29 However, to prevent being maneuvered and taken over by Fatah, Hamas called for general elections among all Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank. If situations prevented carrying out these elections, Hamas demanded roughly 40% of the seats on the PNC.30 Moreover, Hamas demanded amendments in the Palestinian National Charter, espousal of the jihad as the only way to free Palestine, and dismissal of political concessions with Israel. Hamas claimed that since the policy of the PLO was misguided, it was the PLO that must give in and agree to Hamas’s policy and not the other way around.31 The PLO kept on pressuring Hamas to recognize its special power over the Palestinian ground and trying to invalidate the autonomous status of Hamas. The PLO also condemned the actions of Hamas, suggesting that the Muslim Brotherhood was working with Israel.32 However, Hamas kept on expressing a cautious veneer of devotion to the value of enthusiasm, so as to sustain a deliberation with the PLO on behalf of Palestinian national aspiration, prevention of intra-Palestinian hostility, and the pursuit of a united movement against Israel. Nevertheless, Hamas firmly called for the rule of power sharing with Fatah. The stance of Hamas was clearly articulated in its discussions with Fatah on forming a united municipal committee for Gaza, an attempt that was a part of Hamas’s wide-ranging demands for representation.33 Acting in response to Fatah’s movement condemning Hamas’s rejection to join the PLO as a splinter group, Hamas’s line of reasoning merged ideology and pragmatism; in particular, Hamas appealed to democratic values displaying an enthusiasm to recognize the majority judgment of the Palestinian masses.34 But Hamas also claimed that Islam was the sole possible groundwork for the Palestinian national aspiration. Similar to the Palestinian leftists, Hamas refuted the PLO’s drive toward a conceded Palestinian nation in the occupied lands based on Israeli authority and not essentially due to any religious restrictions on political agreement and concession with Israel.35 The PLO became more and more cynical of Hamas’s persistent efforts to take advantage of the large-scale revolts to boost its political reputation to the detriment of the national forces. The PLO was primarily interested in strengthening its status as the only rightful national power and the representative of the values and ideologies that influenced Palestinian life under Israel.36 The minor part that the armed struggle played in Fatah’s mission resulted in the unavoidable assumption that the leadership of PLO had definitely regarded the Intifada as merely a way to reinforce its standpoint in the peace process.37 On the contrary, Hamas attempted, as revealed by its representative Ibrahim Ghawsha, to “nip it [the peace process] in the bud” and to compel the PLO to recognize the “Islamic program”.38 In terms of foreign policy, Hamas and the PLO are also at odds. The restructuring of Hamas was aimed at improving the organization’s military and political capacity by acquiring financial support from allied states and Islamic advocates, both global and regional. The regional network supplied military resources and operational systems needed to carry out underground communication, transport financial resources and weapons, and recruit manpower.39 But not like the PLO, Hamas originally obtained bulk of its financial resources from Palestinian allies, Islamic and Arab contributors. Hamas’s expansion to global and regional arenas undermined the unity of the organization as a political movement.40 Its increasing dependence on outside military and financial resources shifted the center of the decision-making branch of Hamas from the occupied lands to Amman, where The Political Bureau, a new political unity, was formed in 1992.41 The newly formed body represented the ‘external’ headship and obtained its authority and legitimacy from its power over the military network, financial resources, and strong relationship with the Syrian and Iranian governments and with the Islamic movement in Jordan. The ‘external’ leadership eventually opposed the local Hamas authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip over the advantage of prolonging its approach toward the Palestinian Authority and armed struggle against Israel.42 On the other hand, the Soviet Union became a key entity in the foreign policy of PLO and it was a major entity in aiding the PLO in securing its global status. Nevertheless, Soviet power over the PLO was weak; influence was most successful only when in combination with Arab influence. In the relationship between the PLO and the Soviet Union, the PLO was the means toward Soviet status in the region.43 Due to its Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) status, the PLO may boost or restrict the Soviet status. Syria, once, had an iron grip on the PLO because the organization’s forces were centered in Syria, and its status in relation to the PLO was hence much powerful than that of the Soviet Union.44 The PLO tried persistently to sustain positive relations with every Arab country. Nevertheless, the downfall of the Soviet Union damaged the reputation of PLO by presenting its only international partner as a weak, defenseless entity and the spoiled expectations for considerable Arab financial support to sustain the Intifada. The extended hostility and developing belief that the Intifada had ended with a deadlock compelled the Palestinian people to become more independent and withdrawn, forcing them to consider Islam as their primary source of leadership.45 Meanwhile, the Oslo Accords reveal the conflict between Hamas and the PLO with regard to their attitude toward Israel. The Oslo Accords, broadly recognized as a historic development, formed a Palestinian authority and a degree of autonomy under the leadership of PLO’s Yasir Arafat.46 In contrast to the PLO, the Hamas denounced the Oslo Accords based on ideology, for the limited territory did not satisfy the Islamist aspiration of a united Palestinian state. Nevertheless, this national aspiration also had an actual importance for Hamas, because the evident virtue of the organization’s national aspiration could be used against the PLO. The PLO may seem to be jeopardizing the state.47 The Palestinian Authority of Arafat was not able to deal with or effectively confront the premeditated attacks of Hamas, and was broadly believed to be incompetent. The collapse of Oslo helped Hamas gain greater support against Israel.48 Conclusions Although Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank has achieved a certain level of success by developing into a key political movement in Palestinian society, this organization still confronts several problematic issues. It is still unclear whether Hamas will successfully transform the Islamist national aspiration into a substitute to the PLO and what it represents, into a belief system for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. This form of success will rely on the capacity of the Islamic movement to establish the legitimacy of their aspiration and the practicality of their policies and standpoints as regards the realization of the Palestinian people’s rightful national aspiration. It will also rely on the degree to which the Palestinian people are eager to accept an Islamic identity and prioritize this identity over their national identity. Matters of democracy and multiculturalism have not been a key issue until now for Hamas.49 Inability to express reasonable stances on such matters may push away a large portion of the Palestinian society and as a result weaken the influence of the Islamic movement. Hamas may successfully avoid these matters for a certain period of time by claiming that the urgent and most important concern of the organization is national emancipation from Israeli control. But in spite of that, Hamas has to clarify the grounds for their interaction with other political organizations and with society in general. From an ideological and theoretical perspective, Hamas, or the Islamic movement as a whole, denounces the idea of democracy as a Western model that is incompatible with the Islamic doctrine. Hamas asserts that the Islamic ideology upholds rules that are more unbiased and inclusive. In an Islamic system, political organizations that do not adopt Islam as a belief system will be hindered. On the other hand, the PLO continues to be the foremost and more potent challenge to Hamas. Hamas does not have the strong nationalist reputation and authority which the PLO has gained as a consequence of more than two decades of nationalist opposition to the Israeli hegemony. The PLO is recognized for its attempts at revival and consolidation of the Palestinian national aspiration and for identifying the Palestinian people’s national rights. If Hamas fails to adopt a definite nationalist agenda that addresses the Palestinian people’s aspirations and highlights their right to statehood and independence, Hamas may fail to become a substitute to the PLO or even a major candidate for the rightful representation of the Palestinian people. Nevertheless, Hamas will gain greater support if the PLO is unable to realize the national aspirations it has established for itself. The inability of the PLO to achieve its national aspirations will most probably become a plus point for the Islamic movement. Hamas benefitted greatly when the PLO was not able to succeed despite all the compromises the PLO leaders have agreed to. Hamas has been daring the PLO to generate any concrete accomplishment as an outcome of such compromises. However these Islamic organizations, particularly Hamas, will be obliged to accomplish their objectives and not to take advantage of the weaknesses of others as a way of acquiring greater power or influence. Although the extremist position of the Islamic movement may be pleasing to the Palestinian people, especially due to the growing disappointment with the PLO and its capacity to generate concrete accomplishments, the Islamic movement’s grand aspiration of building an Islamic society and nation in Palestine, which are beyond their reach, at least for now, may generate a similar form of disappointment. The unwillingness of Hamas to team up with the PLO may push away Palestinian people who have faith in the purity of national solidarity. The Muslim Brotherhood, from the very beginning, and eventually Hamas, have declined to team up with the PLO due to clashing political and ideological dissimilarities. Only immediately after the outbreak of the intifada did Hamas deal with this issue. In response to a request to unite with PLO, Hamas demanded as a prerequisite roughly 40% of the seats in PNC. The PLO has turned down this demand. In case the PLO yielded to this demand Hamas may have successfully seized control of the PLO from the inside. Hamas, although no longer demanding a particular percentage of seats in the PNC, demanded general elections outside and within the occupied territories to allow the Palestinian people to choose their delegates in the leadership branches of the PLO. The PLO, once more, turned down this request, claiming that it is not practical at the moment. Hamas challenges the political agenda of the PLO on the whole. Working with a secular PLO which has by now accepted Israel would weaken the core aspiration of Hamas. All these factors make it difficult to establish one unified government. Bibliography Abusada, Mkhaimar. “Palestinian Party Affiliation and Political Attitudes toward the Peace Process.” Arab Studies Quarterly 20.3 (1998): 65. Arens, Omri & Edward Kaufman. “The Potential Impact of Palestinian Nonviolent Struggle on Israel: Preliminary Lessons and Projections for the Future.” The Middle East Journal 66.2 (2012): 231+ Ben-Meir, Alon. “Hamas’s Real Agenda- Power Sharing Although the Islamic Resistance Movement Opposes the Israeli-PLO Peace Process, It Must be Allowed to Participate in Elections.” The Christian Science Monitor (1994): 19. Caridi, Paola. Hamas: From Resistance to Government. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2012. Esposito, John. Islam and politics. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998. Faucon, Benoit. West Bankers. New York: Mashreq Editions Ltd, 2010. Frangi, Abdallah. The PLO and Palestine. London: Zed Books, 1983. Helm, Sarah. “Hamas Seeks Alliance with PLO.” The Independent (1994): 1. Hilal, Jamil. Where Now for Palestine?: The Demise of the Two State Solution. New York: Zed Books, 2007. Jamal, Amal. The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005. Kalideen, Savera & Haidar Eid. “A One State Solution for the Palestine-Israel Conflict: An Interview with Ali Abunimah.” Nebula 5.3 (2008): 78+ Laub, Karin & Mohammed Daraghmeh. “Analysis: Hamas Wants Bigger Regional Role.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch (MO) (2013): A7. Mishal, Shaul & Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Sharif, Bassam Abu. Arafat and the Dream of Palestine: An Insider’s Account. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Weinberger, Peter. Co-opting the PLO: A Critical Reconstruction of the Oslo Accords, 1993-1995. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. Read More