The Constitution - Thesis Example

THE CONSTITUTION The argument that the creation of the Constitution was a conflict founded on competing economic and financial interests by two groups of individuals - those who expected to gain benefits from its approval and those who oppose its ill-effects - was pioneered by Charles A. Beard. In 1913, Beard compiled diverse scholarly views and documents regarding the founding of the Constitution consequently referred to as 'The Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.' Beard's arguments have not been refuted until this day. Beard's thesis suggests that, although he is not meaning to imply that the Federalists created the constitution for personal benefits, the prime beneficiaries under the passage of the Constitution would have been those with commercial and financial interests to safeguard. He further contends that many were disenfranchised and discriminated by the common law and thus were not represented in the Convention during its drafting which included countless adult males. In addition, most of the states at that time imposed property qualifications on the voters and consequently barred non-taxpayers. As most of the members of the conventions were lawyers and representatives of personalty, these individuals were 1'directly and personally interested in the outcome of their labors' and would economically benefit from the passage of the Constitution (Beard 59). Furthermore, Beard asserts that since these men were mostly merchants, shippers, bankers, speculators, and private and public securities holders, the Constitution was not crafted by 'the whole people.' Beard's assertions remained undisputed until 1956 when Robert Brown's critique titled Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution dispels and attacks Beard's thesis and conclusions for their lack of merit. Brown, attacking Beard's objectivity, argues that Beard failed to collect compelling data and evidence to support his contentions. In his critique, Brown scrutinizes the support for the Constitution among diverse economic and social divisions, the democratic character of the country, and the franchise within the states in eighteenth-century America. He holds that Beard was misguided and further added that, eighteenth-century America was democratic, the franchise was common, and there was extensive backing for the Constitution, alleging that his evidence contradicts Beard's arguments about the lack of democracy and the insubstantial support for the Constitution. According to Brown, since the Founding Fathers upheld the Federal voting system done by indirect representation, the ratification of the Constitution was a democratic process and everyone's interests were aptly represented. Brown further argues that the constitution was not merely an economic document in which property was protected but it also stressed safeguards to life and liberty. This protection of property, Brown adds, is also essential to the protection of the individual and liberty. A close scrutiny of the US Constitution is necessary in order to resolve this conflict as the issue has its precedence in the Constitution itself. The textbook, 'We The People,' states that the charter 2'attempts to create a government that would be strong to protect commerce and property rights yet weak enough to threaten individual liberty.' The statement strengthens Brown's contentions that the provisions governing the protection of property are significant parts of the constitution. The Constitution also emphasizes that that the framers, 3'feared the call of equality' which could result to equal allotment of property, and consequently violate the freedom of property owners. Although Beard is right with his assertions that the economic interests of the framers and those who represented the public were given utmost importance, the focus on economic interests and rights to property as well as protection of those rights fortified individual freedom. It is also important to note that these economic interpretations of the Constitution have their historical precedence as when the US broke away from the tax and trade policy pressures from colonial England - factors leading to the American Revolution (Texbook We the People). Beard in his article also mentions that there were 'competing' interests in the foundation of the Constitution but the textbook We the People mentions that these interests were reconciled during the 'compromises' and 'plans' in Philadephia. Furthermore, in their articles, both Brown and Beard refer to the idea of Federalism also found in the text. Beard argues that during the passage of the Constitution, many sectors of the population were not properly represented. Brown refuted this argument by saying that the process upon which the Constitution was voted was through indirect representation, a hallmark in the American Federal government embodied in the Constitution. Brown's disputations were supported by the text in which it states that indirect democracy could thwart 'tyranny of the majority.' Similar convictions devised by Beard were previously utilized by the Antifederalists when they argued that 4'the nation was too large to effectively represent all citizens' and thus Beard surmised that a big number of citizens were disenfranchised as a result. As a both Beard and Brown failed to back their claims with reputable statistical data, taking a position in this argument will be challenging. However, Brown's arguments carry more weight than those of Beard's. Brown's thesis was further strengthened when a study in 1958 done by Forrest McDonald, objectively inspected the assets, economic interests, and the votes of the representatives to the constitutional convention in Philadelphia. McDonald's main interest was aimed at testing Charles A. Beard's hypothesis. From the facts gathered at the Philadelphia convention (McDonald 110), he stated that, 5"anyone wishing to rewrite the history of those proceedings largely or exclusively in terms of the economic interests represented there would find the facts to be insurmountable obstacles." McDonald concludes that, 6"On all counts, then, Beard's thesis is entirely incompatible with the facts." These statements only fortified Brown's contentions that Beard failed to collect compelling data and evidence to support his thesis. Other studies which came out after McDonald's also included similar conclusion. Robert A. McGuire and Robert L. Ohsfeldt in 1984 created a critical reevaluation of the adoption of the Constitution in which they assume that the founders were prompted by self-interest because of the satisfaction they could garner from the preferences they had chosen during the convention in Philadelphia. However, according to McGuire and Ohsfeld, self-interest and economic judiciousness do not entail that a founder only cared about his financial or material welfare. This economic model signifies that a founder contemplated the pros (the satisfaction) and cons (the sacrifice) of his actions (McGuire and Ohsfeld 512). Thus, a founder formulated choices that included his self-interest; however, these choices were 7'broadly defined to include any pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits and costs of his choices'. For McGuire and Ohsfeld this is called the 8'presumption of rational choice'. More studies and research came out later to dispute Beard's assertions. These include William H. Riker's "The Lessons of 1787." Riker asserts that 'military threats' to in the 1780s can elucidate the implementation of a secure central government. He argues that the framers of the Constitution were distinct from the modern day politicians who only think of their self-interest. The accomplishments of the framers of the Constitution could not be emulated today because the 9'framers were less partisan and more disinterested than the politicians today.' Clinton Rossiter also acquiesces to the aforementioned idea in his book the Grand Convention stating that the founders were fundamentally 10"like-minded gentlemen" whose interests and political leanings were parallel. Rossiter explicitly rejects an economic interpretation of the Constitution. Likewise, one of the most convincing refutation against Beard's beliefs were written by the legal scholar Bruce Ackerman in his book We the People who presents a 'dualist' theory of the politics of the framers of Constitution in his effort to recover the 'true' radical and 'revolutionary' dispositions of the founders, affirming that the founders were "dualist democrats." Ackerman claims that the founders' behaviors were different during "constitutional politics" and during "normal politics." He concluded that founders successfully put aside their self-interests during the drafting of the Constitution and upheld instead the 11"rights of citizens and the permanent interests of the community." Ackerman dismisses Beard's economic interpretation of the constitution as 'not serious' (Ackerman 56) Up to this day, Beard's assertions failed to be refuted and solutions also replete the world of politics on how to confront the issue initiated by Beard. Although these solutions were prepared assiduously, I would like to utilize more simple solutions with regards the issue. First, I believe that the framers of the constitution were guided by the principles of Christianity and nationalism in which this country and our constitution were established and founded upon. Although this is not measurable using quantitative analysis, we must presume that the guiding principles of faith and nationalism were ingrained in the minds of the founding fathers during the framing of the constitution. Second, personal interests are parallel to the interests of the posterity. Just like we are today, our ancestors were also concerned of the future of their children and they would never put this future at stake. Thirdly, when we use the psychology of voting in modern day elections, most voters, although they have political prejudices, vote conscientiously as they are also concerned about the next generation. This does not mean that partisanship is not beneficial. It only means that voters have preferences and take sides on the issue where most of the time they refuse to put their self-interests first. As a solution for this dilemma with regards our Constitution, we must conduct a survey on rich and influential voters in our society if they will choose laws, issues and regulations in order to protect their economic and financial interests over the interests of the majority. Town and community regulations are evident in this psychology of voting as most members of the community only want the good for the whole. Even PTA meetings in school show that parents exhibit prudence and rationality on issues with regards the school and their children's education. In addition, Property size does not measure intent or 'size' of self-interest. Numerous wealthy men and women in our society today and in the past, supported issues putting their economic interests aside. We must presume that our founding fathers likewise supported issues for the best interests of everyone. Lastly, as our constitution, though not perfect, survived for generations securing our freedoms and rights, we can say that the framers of the constitution were not motivated by economic and personal benefits. The end results justify the means - thus we could conclude that the means and the intentions of the makers of the constitution were not steered by personal gains nor financial and economic benefits. WORKS CITED Ackerman, Bruce. We the People, two volumes. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991. Beard, Charles A. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1913 Brown, Robert E. Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956. Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Being a Collection of Essays written in Support of the Constitution agreed upon September 17, 1787, by the Federal Convention. New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1937. McDonald, Forrest. We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958. McGuire, Robert A., and Robert L. Ohsfeldt. "Economic Interests and the American Constitution: A Quantitative Rehabilitation of Charles A. Beard." Journal of Economic History 44 (1984): p. 509-519. Riker, William H. "The Lessons of 1787." Public Choice 55 (1987): p. 5-34. Rossiter, Clinton. 1787: The Grand Convention. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1966. Storing, Herbert J. The Complete Anti-Federalist, volumes 1 through 7. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Read More