Operation Iraqi Freedom - Article Example

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Introduction and Background The immediate or prime objective of the U.S controlled alliance operation of Iraq launched on the 23rd of March of 2003, famously referred to as Operation Iraqi Freedom was to immediately remove the Saddam Hussein rule and also to make it impossible to use their weapons of mass destruction and also disabling it to allowing these weapons to be used by the terrorist forces. However, by the passage of time these objectives of OIF actually altered i.e. changed from the elimination of the Saddam rule to the a more detailed and open ended assignment of enabling the Government of Iraq (GoI) to develop economic stability, strengthen security and found a democratic system of government. It is important to note that since it is the case that now in 2009, when the Iraqis are becoming increasingly interested in managing their affairs themselves and also the developments or gains acquired since the rebellions of 2006 and 2007 seem to be sustained still, the war appears to be winding down. The OIF and also the US-Iraqi mutual relations have greatly been affected and changed since January 1, 200, due to the introduction and immediate implementation of the new U.S.-Iraqi security arrangement. This agreement has introduced significant aspects relating to the notion that Iraqis are responsible for their own security. This is further affirmed by the statement of Robert Gates the Secretary of Defense of U.S. that this agreement clearly indicates that the involvement of the U.S. military in Iraq has significantly started to wind up. In addition the ground U.S. forces have also indicated that in almost all of the U.S controlled parts of Iraq the military advance has shifted to stability operations form counterinsurgency (COIN), these operations include aiding the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to reinforce security and take measures to the building of governance structure and economic stability. In North Carolina, on 27th of February of 2009, at Camp Lejeune, President Obama, while delivering his speech stated the drawdown of the U.S military forces from Iraq by the August of 2010, and also the path over which the war will be brought down to its end, and also most importantly the rest of the military mission aimed to advise and train the Iraqi forces, by carrying out counter-terrorism operations and providing a enforced security for the U.S. personnel. As about hundred and forty thousand troops set up in Iraq in addition to the U.S. contractors, and civilian experts who are substantially providing assistance to their correspondents in Iraq on the grounds of economic development, security and government, it is considerable that this transition from the United States grows from strong commitment. Moreover, it has been suggested by the senior U.S. officials, for instance Secretary Gates and Ryan Crocker the departing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, that the lasting change in Iraq will require considerable time and it is quite likely that the relations between the two nations will continue to persist as the U.S. military involvement in Iraq comes to its end. On the other hand, on the part of the Government of Iraq (GoI), it faces some crucial aspects that need to be structured and defined immediately; as on the operational plane it faces the enduring elements of uprising and also at the strategic level the acquisition of a shared and single vision of the Iraqi population along with the development of the ability to provide the state with democratic government system, foster economic development and ensure appropriate level of security. The principle aspects that are prominent in the Obama Administration, along with the support of the hundred and eleventh Congress, include the recognition of how the U.S. strategic objectives and national interests in Iraq and adjoining region will guide future U.S. involvement, along with the evaluation and scrutinizing of the influences of the changes in the role and presence of U.S. in Iraq, and establishing the grounds for future mutual relationships that are more traditional. Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the 111th Congress, include identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of (Dale, P. 1-3) Assessments of Failures and Successes Hooker (2005) in his book “Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military Intelligence Assessments” discusses the most prominent intelligence failure on Iraq by the U.S. advancement. He states that most of questioned would answer that it was the failure to locate the weapons of mass destruction. However, far more importantly, provided the long running campaign for the counterinsurgency; it was clearly the inability to discern the nature of the culture of the Iraqi community with appropriate level of precision. This can be seen from the fact that most of issues faced by the U.S. forces in Iraq bud from the misunderstanding that fashioned the original incursion arrangement. According to Hooker the sheer size of the failure requires scrutiny. The phrase ‘sheer size of the failure’ is sufficient enough to express the fact that faulty comprehension was common to every single agency of the U.S. government and also that the state of Iraq after Saddam was never understood by anyone. Though it is quite obvious that full extent of the intelligence’s scope will take time to be identified, it is clear that Hooker’s opinion is a worthy literature. Hooker as a senior intelligence analyst as the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had a ringside position for the Operation Iraqi Freedom where he was working since 1996. This position enabled him to observe that policy of the military and importantly the Pentagon’s wish to launch the war on a fast track, along with the conjectures of military revolution, militated against a more precise comprehension of the possibility of the Iraqi uprising. In addition as the CENTCOM was unable to establish on a single war plan even before two years before the invasion itself, it was directed to establish three different plans that were made for a shallower analysis. To sum up, the hesitant directives by Donald Rumsfeld the Defense Secretary were expressed to be as an iterative approach which were pillared on numerous nations most of which were unrealistic and amateurish. Hooker moreover states that instead of clarifying the detailed plan in consecutive equipped alternatives, under this process the planners actually paid little or no attention to the directives of the Pentagon as they increasingly began to make assumptions that were unrealistic. (Hooker, N. P.) Moreover there are other prominent set of issues that must be addressed. On one hand intelligence was able to indicate there will be significant problems to come, for instance these were the issues of lower level quarrels that were expected after the fall, the risk of pro-Saddam and pro-Saddam disruption and most importantly terrorism. However, on the other hand intelligence did seem to have problems in producing an assessment of particular problems with certain level of accuracy, these were, for instance the national building and development and bringing an end to the conflict, and to worsen the situation it wasn’t able to correspond these issues to the top officials. It is not enough that the intelligence only focuses on the abilities of the enemies. It is also important that the weaknesses and strengths of the potential allies should also be assessed with certain level of objectivity i.e. least possible intervention by the policymakers. This was the case with the United States particularly, as actually failed to evaluate the information from defectors and exiles, as most of these overrated their abilities and or lied. These issues were not in particular limited to the external opposition. But it was also common to the evaluation of the of the principle regions of the Iraqi population, one of these was for instance the support from the Shias in the south, was quite expected from the Britain and United States, this wasn’t actually provided, or what was provided wasn’t expected. It wasn’t really clear that the detailed analysis of the risks associated to the influences of U.S. and Britain’s actions was done effectively, moreover it was also blur that what were exactly the levels and the extent of power in the Shiites and in their divisions. It was certainly the case that the significance of Shiite spiritual leaders and their hunt for influence and political authority, troubles created due to the need if any material political organization within the Shiites and the comparative potency of Iranian-backed Shiite confrontation activities versus the other resistance movements, were highly underestimated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Analogous circumstances were faced in other regions, particularly in the central Iraq where the Sunnis were in majority and the diverse regions close to Baghdad. The intelligence measures were particularly not able to differentiate, with certain level of accuracy, that which areas were prone to the Ba’thist resistance and from where the support was expected. The risk of a cohesive Ba’th resistance in the Sunni triangle, Baghdad and Tikrit, was exaggerated by the intelligence services during the war, and after the war wasn’t actually expecting to deal with the scattered and variable uprisings in these areas by the loyalists of the Saddam Hussein and the Ba’thists. (Cordesman, p. 511-524) The very initial Special Operations Forces were accompanied by the operational level analysts and intelligence collectors. The intelligence’s resources were actually active far earlier than the actual beginning spark of the war, in addition, as the commitment to the war of the U.S. forces increased the dependency and requirement for the presence of an intelligence community also increased . (Choate, P.13) The information provided to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) regarding Iraqi plans and military capabilities were provided well before the beginning the war by the intelligence agencies. It was due to this early intelligence support that the forces planned and reacted promptly to the advancement of the Iraqi forces, which resulted in further intelligence. (Dine, P. B1) The U.S. forces actually had to go quail hunting so that precise and harassed attacks could be launched in order to drive out the Iraqi forces out of the intended areas so that later they could be made clear to the air strikes, and it certainly was the case that the air strikes proved to be influential. The SOF were strongly in association with the persistent surveillance platforms, while carrying out their missions, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), whereas on the other hand the AC-130 gunships along with the Navy Strike aircrafts and Air Force were also active. It was due to the services of the intelligence community that all of these forces were brought together. The military intelligence resources in OIF served as the multiplier of the forces as it went beyond its conventional position. Campaign’s every step was well guided by the intelligence support as it enabled the forces to dominate the forces, formed the combat zone and produced opportunities for the allied forces .(Choate, P.7) Unlike the conventional and expensive approach that took usually a longer time, in case of Iraq it actually developed due to the intelligence assistance. The Navy League was addressed by General Richard Myers the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the new way of the American war strategy has evolved greatly by incorporating intelligence along with high tech communication and weapons thus making it more precise and agile. (Stansfield, p.1) By the end of the first week since the war had stated about 50 U.S. Special Forces were present in Iraq. In order to be easily pointed out by the air strike the teams were made to appear ten feet tall as the targets were lit up with the help of lasers. The Special Forces along with the Polish, British and Australian forces were about ten thousand in number and were equipped with advanced weaponry than the Delta Force and the Army Rangers that were active in Mogadishu. In addition to the availability of the sound communication resources along with the night vision gear they also had the availability of real time scenarios of enemy’s territories and superb support from the air strike. (Knickerbocker, p. 01) It was due to the prominent cooperation between CIA’s paramilitary forces the SOF’s of U.S. that the crucial oil fields were secured before they could be destroyed, moreover allowed to rescue the injured soldiers and prisoners of war and hinder Iraqi ballistic missile attacks on the U.S. friendly targets. (O’Rourkey, p. 60) In addition to the provision of vital protection of the forces, the intelligence resources helped to identify targets precisely, and strengthened correspondence between intelligence agencies and SOFs and between SOFs and conventional forces, for instance the recognition of the Ba’ath political party was possible due to the association between SOF and the CIA. Moreover, the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) enabled the Green Parrot soldiers to rescue from the hospital in Nasiriya the injured Jessica Lynch the Private First Class (PFC). (Bowers, p. 01) According to an unnamed U.S. intelligence officer, Iraq was portrayed as a playground for the SOF and the CIA, as he expressed that they were looking forward for the directives of the CIA and SOF’s paramilitaries in order to collapse the Saddam regime 50. Getting assistance from the intelligence community the Special Operations Forces were able to secure almost all of the prominent oil terminals along with the Haditha Dam. Moreover they also knocked upon the Chinese build fiber optic liner used for communication, in order to interpose into the communication between Iraqi political leaders and military. (Special Report, N.P.) Works Cited Bowers, Faye, “Behind the Lines, an Unseen War; CIA and Other Covert Operatives Help US Seize Vital Sites and Target Ruling Elite as Fighting Closes in on Baghdad,” Christian Science Monitor, 2003 Choate, Mark. “Knowing is Half the Battle”, INSCOM Journal for the Military Intelligence Professional, Almanac 2003, 13 Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons Praeger Security International. CSIS, 2003 Dale, Katherine.”Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results and Issues for Congress”, April 2009, an analysis by Congressional Research Service, September 17, 2009 www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf Dine, Phillip. “Covert Ops”, Newswatch, April 23 2003, Lexis-Nexis, September, 18, 2009. Hooker, Gregory. Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military Intelligence Assessments. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005. Knickerbocker, Brad “Lessons of Somalia Bolster US Successes; Iraq’s Battle Plan”, Christian Science Monitor, 2003 O’Rourke, Ronald. Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress; Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2003 "Special Report: Coming to the end of options - Strategy in Iraq; Strategy in Iraq." Economist. 28 Oct 2006. 29. eLibrary. ProQuest LLC. ROBINSON SECONDARY SCH. 17 Sep 2009. http://elibrary.bigchalk.com Stansfield, Gareth. "Iraq War." Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia. 2009. Grolier Online. 17 Sep. 2009 http://gme.grolier.com/cgi-bin/article?assetid=0149803-0 Read More