Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohanes Opposing Theories of Cooperation Among States - Literature review Example

Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane’s Opposing Theories of Cooperation Among s By ID Number Module and Number of Professor/ Tutor Date of Submission Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane’s Opposing Theories of Cooperation Among States Introduction Waltz considers states to be ordered anarchically, and therefore among states, the state of nature reflects the threat of war. The lack of a government does not usually cause greater violence, and as seen in history some of the wars causing the greatest destruction occurred within states, and not between them. Hence, Waltz argues that “no human order is proof against violence”, and “the distinction between national and international realms of politics is not found in the use or nonuse of force but in their different structures” (Waltz, 1986, p99). Waltz’ argument is based on his theory related to balance-of-power that disputes cooperation among states. Keohane (1998) opposes Waltz’s concepts, and states that institutions create the capability of states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agreements also termed as transaction costs by economists. The states mostly do not engage in centralised enforcement of agreements, “but they do reinforce practices of reciprocity, which provide incentives for governments to keep their own commitments to ensure that others do so as well” reiterates Jordan (2001, p.236). Thus, Keohane supports the institutions and systems theories promoting cooperation. Thesis Statement: The purpose of this paper is to investigate why Kenneth Waltz’s theory does not predict cooperation among states, examine the reasons and conditions under which Robert Keohane’s theory does predict that cooperation will take place; and identify and explain why one of the two accounts is empirically more accurate. Waltz’s and Keohane’s Differing Theories of States’ Cooperation The main difference in structure that Lau (1987) observes in Waltz’s theory is that the author refers to the international system as one of self-help, while the domestic system is not so. Consequently, states cannot afford to specialize and increase their level of economic interdependence in the way parts of a nation can. Due to states’ inability to rely on anyone to protect them internationally, they have to take measures towards “providing the means of protecting themselves against others” (Waltz, 1986, p.101). Waltz often compares competition and cooperation in the economic market and in the area of international politics (Lau, 1987). Similar to individual organizations, states also aim to increase their gains. However, even if cooperation with another state would help to acquire considerable gains, they will not attempt to do so, to avoid an unequal distribution of the gains, which may result in a change in the distribution of power between the two states. Thus, if an expected gain is to be divided in the ratio of two to one, “one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other”, states Waltz (1986, p.101). Thus, even the prospect of absolute and immense gains for both states does not create cooperation among them, due to their fears on how the other will use its increased capabilities. Significantly, the impediments to collaboration do not necessarily lie in the character and the immediate intention of either party; on the other hand, the “condition of insecurity – at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions – works against their cooperation” (Waltz, 1986, pp.101-102). Further, Waltz (1986) argues that states are also concerned about becoming dependent on others through cooperative initiatives and exchange of goods and services. This, according to Lau (1987), reflects Waltz’ contention that the basic nature of this structure results in international consequences which states as the participants do not necessarily aim to create. The hesitation of states to becoming dependent on other through cooperative endeavours “is the second way in which the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states” (Waltz, 1986, p.103). High interdependence results in a common vulnerability, and the participant states attempt to secure that which they depend on. For small and ill-endowed states, the cost of resisting closer interdependence may be high, hence they would not do so. But those states which can resist becoming increasingly enmeshed with others do so in both or one of two ways. Like other organisations, states seek to lessen their dependency, or to control what they depend on. This is the basic concept that “explains quite a bit of the behaviour of states: their imperial thrusts to widen the scope of their control and their autarchic strivings to wards greater self-sufficiency” (Waltz, 1986, p.103). Rational behaviour in the international system, due to the structural constraints, does not result in the required results. Each country is constrained to take care of itself, hence none can take care of the system. When structural change does not take place, the processes such as the arms race, population growth, and pollution will continue to be adverse side effects of the states’ pursuit of self-interest. However, Waltz is opposed to structural change. On the other hand, he argues in favour of the “virtues of anarchy” (Waltz, 1986, p.108). Any governing organisation pursues the maintenance of its own existence as an organisation. According to the author, any central governing agency would be subjected to controversy over its control and the policies it should implement; hence it would never attain the strong power it would require to control member states. Scholars such as Organski (1958) and Gilpin (1981) have written on the strength and position of states and their inclination to fight. The authors argue that peace prevails only after one state establishes its dominance. Thus, “the hegemonic state lacks the need to fight, and other states lack the ability”, states Waltz (1993, p.76). However, some states may ally together to challenge the superior one, and in this process when leading states decline, other states rise to contest them. States are free to leave each other alone in the absence of organisation; and even if they do not do so, in the absence of the politics of organisation, states are better able to “concentrate on the politics of the problem and to aim for a minimum agreement that will permit their separate existence, rather than a maximum agreement for the sake of maintaining unity” (Waltz, 1986, p.110). Thus, if might is the deciding factor, then bloody disputes over right can be prevented more easily. Finally, in response to whether a more modified version of the anarchic system would be possible, Waltz asserts that the only two ordering principles of political systems include anarchy and hierarchy. The author observes that there is a regular pattern in the international system that can be described as Realpolitik. The states’ interest fuels action, while the requirements of policy emerge from the unregulated competition of states; “calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate test of policy; and success is defined as strengthening and preserving the state” (Waltz, 1986, p.116). It is Balance-of-power (BOP) theory that explains the outcomes of states’ individual pursuit of Realpolitik policies. The balance-of-power theory is based on states at a minimum seeking their own preservation, and at a maximum, driving for universal domination. They do this through internal efforts by increasing economic power, military strength, and other means, and through external efforts such as reinforcing one’s own aliance while weakening an opposing one. Balance-of-power theory does not imply that states attempt to preserve the balance; they may or may not have this purpose. Lau (1987, p.1) states that it “simply means that the BOP is what results from all states acting rationally out of self-interest”. Thus, the balance-of-power politics prevail wherever only two requirements are met: “that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive” (Waltz, 1986, p.120). Keohane’s argument opposes that of Waltz, predicting cooperation among states. Frequently, even powerful states areinterested in complying with the rules of well-established international institutions, because general conformity to rules renders the behaviour of other states more predictable. By reducing uncertainty and the costs of making and enforcing agreements, international institutions promote the achievement of collective gains by states (Keohane, 1998). Keohane and Nye (1977) state that international governmental organisations (IGOs) concerning networks, norms and institutions may have norms associated with specific international regimes. However, they belong to a broader category than regimes because they include patterns of elite networks and if relevant, a range of formal institutions. However, in a world distinguished by increasing interdependence, the use of international regimes for governments may increase. International governmental organisations may help to solve common problems and achieve complementary purposes, without lowering themselves to subsidiary positions in relation to hierarchical systems of control (Keohane, 1984). Keohane (1984) focuses on the system characteristics because he believes that “the behaviour of states as well as that of other actors, is strongly affected by the constraints and incentives provided by the international environment” (p.26). With changes in the international system, shifts in incentives and behaviour are bound to occur. The author’s ‘outside-in’ perspective is similar to that of systemic forms of Realist theory or structural realism. The difference of Keohane’s (1984) argument from that of structural realism is his focus on the effects of international institutions and practices on state behaviour. According to the Realists, the distribution of power is vital, as is the distribution of wealth. However, human activity at the international level also has its impacts, altering the information available to governments and the opportunities open to them; moreover, commitments to support such institutions cannot be broken. “International regimes therefore, change the calculations of advantage that governments make” (Keohane, 1984, p.26). International regimes require systematic study and understanding in order to comprehend the combining of the structural realist theory based on distribution of power and wealth with foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz’ response to those who contend that the balance-of-power theory does not explain states’ policies, is that the theory is not one of foreign policy, but of international politics. It cannot explain how a particular state will behave in a specific situation; on the other hand, it explains the outcome of collective behaviour. Testing his theory, Waltz maintains that falsification should not be applied as the ultimate test, but that one should find confirming examples also. The main problems include that the balance-of-power theory offers indeterminate predictions, and although states’ actions are determined by external conditions, they are subject to internal considerations as well (Lau, 1987). Waltz (1986) observes that states such as France and Russia in 1894 may form allies even though they may have good reasons not to. This is because states in competition are inclined to have similar policy and socialisation to international norms. This, according to the author indicates an acceptance of the rules of power politics. It is concluded that Waltz’s theory that does not predict cooperation among states is more accurate, because he has supported his views with clear arguments on competition, cooperation, dependency, and structural constraints, which are based on anarchy, hierarchy and balance-of-power among states. Robert Keohane’s theories of institutional significance, and realists’ distribution of power and wealth, are valid, however, they cannot accurately predict cooperation among states to be beneficial. ----------------------------------------------- Bibliography Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. 1977. Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Boston: Brown Publications. Keohane, R.O. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world of political economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, R.O. 1998 Spring. International institutions: Can interdependence work? Foreign Policy, 110, pp.86-87. Gilpin, R. 1981. War and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jordan, R.S. 2001. International organisations: A comparative approach to the management of cooperation. Edition 4. Westport, CT: Praeger Publications. Lau, O. 1987. Summary, Kenneth Waltz’ ‘Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power’. http://www.olivialau.org/ir/archive/wal8.pdf [Accessed 20 December 2012]. Organski, A.F. 1958. World politics. New York: Knopf Publications. Waltz, K. 1986. Anarchic orders and balances of power. In: R.O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and its critics. New York: Columbia University Press, Ch.5, pp.98-128. Waltz, K.N. 1993 Autumn. The emerging structure of international politics. International Security, 18(2), pp.44-79. Read More