Diplomats Role in Solving Major Military Confrontations - Coursework Example

Diplomats Role in Solving Major Military Confrontations Diplomats are probably the most misconstrued servant of any government as people see them as bureaucrats and party animals. However, not all or probably majority of diplomats plays significant roles in shaping their country’s international relations particularly in economic and political interest. The beginning of the Cold War brought new challenges to the power of diplomacy in sustaining peace and understanding between nations thus diplomats were obliged to carry out new strategies. The clear and present danger of the Soviet nuclear expansion was at the beginning countered by the United States with arms production resulting in a contest that apparently nobody would win. Consequently, both sides realizing the grim consequences and future annihilating effects of endless arms race, diplomatic approach was given a chance to solve and improve U.S. and Soviet relations. The following discussion will deal with the actual role of diplomats in international relations predominantly in resolving potential major military confrontations during the Cold War. In 1982, when asked about diplomat’s role, Philip Charles Habib, one of U.S. respected career diplomats replied, “Not all diplomats are peace negotiators, but all peace negotiators are diplomats”. Apparently, diplomats are not necessarily a peace negotiators but peace negotiators involuntarily assume the role of a diplomat whenever solving crisis. Habib’s statement undoubtedly is in contrast with the myth and widespread impression that a diplomat is just another person, sent to a foreign land, to lie for his country (Kriesler 1982, p.1). A diplomat is not just a representative of a nation to another nation, as he has to represent the views and policies of his government. Consequently, he is responsible for creating a good image of his country abroad and ensures that he represents his government’s interests well. To understand the role of a diplomat, we need to be aware of the role of diplomacy itself. The onset of diplomacy in the development of international relations can be trace to as early as the 17th and 18th century, when European great thinkers and philosophers like Grotius and Saint-Pierre became concern by the predicament and consequences of war, predominantly in international scale. Since then, ideas of diplomacy for international reconciliation spreads throughout Western Europe, and during the Vienna Conference in 1815, the channel of diplomatic communication is codified and the role of career diplomat is instituted (Spyridakis 1997, p.1). The evolutionary trend of the 20th century and the dilemma of World War I brought a new set of international relations optimism to maintain peace through applications of moral principles and international law. As a result, the spirit of cooperation between nations develops, and at the end of World War II, the United Nations was established. However, along with the good objective of the UN comes the onset of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, which in the passing of time developed into a serious conflict that lead to the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and the Warsaw Pact of 1955. This diplomatic alliance and accord is to prevent the impending confrontation between the two superpowers and to balance the war capabilities of both sides. Since then the “equilibrium of fear” which we now recognized as the Cold War lasted for nearly half a century. (Spyridakis 1997, p.2). Despite the apathy of a lingering war and the desire of the public for peace in the midst of the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union, predominantly to Western Europe and the United States, President Harry Truman was reluctant to increase the U.S. military budget. He believes that their military and economic capabilities are sufficient to deter the Soviets invasion. However, as the Cold War intensifies and expanding international commitments, U.S. military resources around the world started to decline and the Truman administration’s national security policies started to consider a change. Although not fully convinced, his decision to consider the increase in defence expenditures was mainly influenced by the result of the NSC: 68 submitted by diplomat Paul Nitze (who previously served in the U.S. Bombing Strategy Survey in World War II) contains comprehensive assessment of the global communist threat (Preble 2005, p.2). Nitze was later appointed head of the U.S. Policy Planning Staff to work on the remake of the national security strategy. He and his staff are responsible for creating documents that would paint desolate images of the communist threat and the obdurate hostility of the Soviet Regime (Preble 2005, p.3). Truman shocked by the Korean War, the spread of communism in China, and the Soviets nuclear weapons program, significantly increased the defence budget, and approve the NSC: 68 as the official national security policy (Preble 2005, p.4). Moreover, the containment strategy contained in NSC:68 was also adopted and used as part of the national security strategy throughout the Cold War (Drew 1996, p.5) This is the onset of the nuclear arms race between the superpowers, which was further intensified by the launching of the first intercontinental ballistic missile by the Soviet Union in 1957. Moreover, the U.S. uncertainties grew extensively when the first manufactured orbiting satellite (Sputnik) was launched by the Soviets two months later. The U.S. felt falling behind the race and need to consider some other options to deter the ever-growing threat of the Soviet Union (Preble 2005, p.8). The reality that nobody will benefit in the continuous proliferation of nuclear weapons and other destructive efforts altered the course of “preventive war” strategies to multilateral diplomacy. Diplomacy through international organizations and conventions of various forms drove by the need of having a global solution that is universal in nature. Consequently, the work of diplomats radically changed and they were obliged to move within various contexts of action, perceptions of the international predicaments, adopting or creating new strategies to fulfil their roles (Spyridakis 2005, p.2). Bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations soon began to take its course to improve the climate between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In 1972, the U.S. and Soviets agreed to start bilateral discussions in Geneva and this was followed the other negotiations that led to the finalization of INF (Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty in 1988, START I (Strategic Arms and Reduction) Treaty in 1991, and the 1993 START II. Geneva became the meeting ground for the United State and the Soviet Union bilateral discussions and in 1982, the famous U.S. Ambassador Paul Henry Nitze and Soviet arms control negotiator Yuri Kvitsinsky began their INF negotiations to eliminate an entire class of intermediate and short-range ground launched cruise missiles. This meeting is commonly known as the “walks in the woods” that gave INF Treaty a new hope. Although the agreement reached by these arms control negotiators were met with objections and criticism on both sides, it is significant to the Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva meeting in 1985 that led to the successful conclusion of the INF and START Treaties and opened the way to the enhancement of the United States and Soviet Union relations (SDBAC 2004, 57). The result of INF Treaty negotiations obliged both sides to get rid of intermediate and short-range ground launched cruise and ballistic missiles by the end of May 1991 (SDBAC, 2004, p.58). Diplomats like Paul Henry Nitze were the lead player in successful arms reduction negotiations during the Cold War and their diplomatic efforts surely are surely way beyond conventional diplomacy. They became arms negotiators and gentle diplomats at the same time performing their role not only for the best interest of their government but also for the well-being of the world. Nitze is best remembered as a diplomat who achieved two major arms agreement through conciliatory efforts by cutting through bureaucratic tangle and informally tried to strike a bargain on intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe (Berger 2004, p.1). The United States diplomat’s role in arms negotiations is not for U.S. interest alone but apparently for NATO allies as well. The U.S. diplomats persistently represents Europe in arms talks not only because they have the military advantage but for the demonstrated “lack of territorial ambition” (Drew 1996, p.133) of the United States. The diplomat’s role in resolving major military conflicts apparently went beyond the normal expectation during the Cold War. The facts clearly shows that these diplomats are not just mouthpieces of any administration but a man of strategy and control who are capable of delivering favourable outcomes in the midst of an imminent nuclear war. Diplomats Paul Henry Nitze and Yuri Kvitsinsky achievements are beyond the success of negotiations as their informal but gracious approach to arms reduction not only led to the fulfilment of Treaties but also conveyed a simple but encouraging message to the world; that diplomacy can still work for peace. Throughout the Cold War and even today, diplomats are always in midst of peace and war, negotiating for a non-violent resolution of any international conflicts. Finally, the absence of World War III and diminishing nuclear weapons are products of faithful and intelligent diplomatic efforts and we should be thankful to our diplomats. Bibliography Berger Marilyn, 2004, Paul Nitze, Cold War Arms Expert, Dies at 97, New York Times October 20, 2004 Drew Nelson, 1996, NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, National Defence University, Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC, NDU Press publications, ISSN: 1071-7552 Kriesler Harry, 1982, Conversation with Philip C. Habib, The Work of Diplomacy, Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, Available online at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Habib/habib2.html Preble Christopher, 2005, The Uses of Threat Assessment in Historical Perspective: Perception, Misperception and Political Will, Foreign Policy Studies, The Cato Institute SDBAC, 2004, Arms Control and Disarmament, The Geneva Briefing Book, Bureau of Arms Control Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Spyridakis Emmanuel, 1997, The Role of Diplomacy in Handling International Crises in the Post-Bipolar Era: The Case of the Balkans, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, Greece Read More