Why States Decide to Go to War - Case Study Example

WHY STATES DECIDE TO GO TO WAR Name Institution Tutor Date Why states decide to go to war Introduction The concept of war has been predominant among the human kind for centuries and has been used to settle disputes, resolve feuds and to safeguard a country’s honor and sovereignty1. Six factors and three systematic processes that enhances the probability of war according to Vasquez are coalitions with non- belligerents, territorial contiguity, continuing rivalries, bandwagon impacts linked with deteriorating norms banning violence, failing political order, economic dependence and multi-polar distribution of capacity in the system, minimization of multi-polarity to polarized systems of two hostile blocs through forming alliances and the two blocs are created in a way that neither has predominance of capacity over the other respectively2. As states decide to go into wars, they conduct themselves in certain ways and more often than not, these behaviors characterize their foreign policies. This forms the basis of this formal report that seeks to explicitly discuss the quote on foreign policy behavior in relation to why states decide to go to war. Foreign Policy Behavior Foreign policies are action plans and strategies that are self-interest in nature which are developed and implemented by states with the intent of safeguarding their national interests and to attain state goals within the environment of international relations. According to Holsti3, national interests as a major determinant of foreign policy behavior and the reasons why states decides to go to war relates to the issues of security, survival, power and relative capability. According to Lebow4, national interests are the main liberal motive for foreign policies and are meant to enhance the wealth of a state. The author notes that national interests are a major cause of war. Foreign policies do, more often than not, dictate the relations among states. An analysis of foreign policy behavior indicates an interplay of varied factors such as national interests, systematic factors, national attribute factors and idiosyncratic factors as the underlying cause for the way states acts and how they develop, design, structure, implement and review its foreign policies and international relations as indicated by the quote. In discussing the quote, the report will analyze various aspects and factors classified under systemic, national attribute and idiosyncratic, which influences foreign policy behavior in relation to why states decide to go to wars. The factor of security Lebow5 suggests that foreign policy behavior are motivated by crises where the policy makers perceive that an action by another major international player as a threat to its national interests, bargaining reputation and its capacity to remain in power, perceptions by policy makers that their actions to counter threat can enhance prospects of war and when policy makers perceive they are acting under time constraints. Crises have the potency to trigger hostile interactions and start of war6. Gartzke7 indicates that international relations and the behavior and decisions by state on whether or not to go to war is much determined by the element of security where a state may decides to form an alliance in a bid to safeguard its national interests or its population and also scare away other nations, compelling them to implement similar measures. The author suggests that although the aspect of fear may force a state to act in a certain way or decide to go to war, it is more so the feeling of uncertainty than security dilemma since wars begins not as a result of relative security or power but as a result of opponents not being able to establish which states have hostile intentions and those with pure and good intentions which can make wars more likely and not less likely8. Lebow9 argues that foreign policy behaviors are facilitated by pursuit of parochial goals by major players which causes other actors to fear for their capacity to sustain themselves and result in hostile interactions. In addition, wars are as a result of a non-linear convergence of causal sequence with independent causes. Lebow10 highlights that based on realistic view, anarchy is the defining factor in international systems for it makes states to make security their utmost point of concern and they seek to enhance power as against other values with power being defined as the capability a state has over other states. According to Lebow11, fear of anarchy and its outcomes encourages major international players to adjust their foreign policy behavior with the view of changing structure and the pluralist security community which was established within democratic industrial economies is partially due to the said process. The end of the cold war and the development of such a community illustrate that nations can break away from the security dilemma12. Holsti13 argues that based on classical realism, the nonexistence of a central power to resolve disputes and crises is the core feature that facilitate the security dilemma, where a state’s search for absolute security makes other states absolutely insecure which generates into hostile interactions such as arms races. Pearson & Rochester14 argues that determinants of foreign policy behavior can only be understood by focusing on the individual, nation state and the international systems level on the causes of war. According to the author, foreign policy behavior and decisions on whether a state decides to go on war or not is based on if the environment offers leaders the chances to attain benefits through wars and also, on the perceptions by the state leaders and their willingness to respond to the perceived opportunities. At an individual level, the nationalistic belief of a person and a leader’s sense of accountability for security of the state can be used to justify going into war15. At the national state level, national attributes such political factors which include aspects such as democratic peace impacts greatly on foreign policy behavior16. The element of security is the core reason for arms races where states are more focused on military priorities, which compels the population to embrace necessity of war and support enhanced production of armaments. The need to be more secure and ensures safety of the population compels various states to engage in arms races, which subsequently, generates an action-reaction process where the perception of threat can deter or fail to deter a state from entering into war with another state. Element of poles and the production/ deterrence of nuclear weapons After the Second World War, it is apparent that international relations and foreign policy behavior among varied states both from the Western and Eastern economies were influenced greatly by the fear or the concept of nuclear weapons and bipolarity as supported by Morgenthau17 in Lebow18. As supported by Watz in his theory of international relations, enhanced production of nuclear weapons contribute instead of eroding system stability and that bipolarity minimizes uncertainty, which encourages system stability compared to other structure such as multi-polarity19. Pertaining to the issue of nuclear weapons, Keir & Press20, the production of nuclear weapons has helped sustain peace since the beginning of the Cold War to the present. The decision on deterrence or on whether to cut on nuclear weapons relies on ways a state can effectively counter a nuclear attack without the nuclear arms and the relative capabilities that a state will retain21. The present pressure for deterrence, which is a pacifistic ideology in intent, can ignite what it seeks to prevent. In Inis22, the author indicates that pacifistic approach toward defense offers encouragement for aggression and that pacifism helps start war since they prevent prevention of war through production of weapons such as nuclear weapons and they inhibit inhibition of war since prohibiting defense in real sense, allowing attack. Gartzke suggests that the states acts the way they do and they decide to go to war based on the element of poles, that is, bipolarity as illustrated by the US-Soviet Union conflict, parity, plurality, hegemony and multi-polarity, which is characterized by majority coalition23. In support of the elements of poles as a determinant of foreign policy behavior and as an underlying factor in states deciding to go to wars24, contradicts Waltz’s theory of international relations by indicating that multi-polarity which allows flexible alignments is more inclined to enhanced peace compared to bipolarity which encourages rigid coalitions and are more war-prone. Be it as it may, both elements of poles, that is, multi-polarity and bipolarity can at different times and among different players deter or trigger wars which therefore, offers the elements of perceived opportunity and willingness in the leaders the determining factor in the decision to go to war or not and in the foreign policy behavior of a state25. Primarily, issues pertaining to economic interests associated with free trade and the establishment of democratic political systems determines the foreign policy behavior since leaders and states are less likely to go into war with other states they have vested economic interests with. Alternatively, states implementing democratic political systems are less likely to go into war with each other where internal state instability compels leaders to establish foreign scapegoats and implement belligerent foreign policies26. Aspects of Power and dominance Foreign policy behaviors and state’s decisions to go to war can also be linked to the need and the desire for the states to dominate also referred to as hegemony where leaders are in pursuit of dominance in terms of economic resources, territorial authority and the power and influence in making rules27. These observations are supported by Gartzke28, who indicates that foreign policy behavior are influenced by the aspect of fear and uncertainties of future changes and the element of power relations where a country with a power in decline relative to other powers develops and implements foreign policies that ensures that it uses its remaining capacities and influence to obscure power relations with the aim of maintaining material and leadership advantages. In regards to the aspect of power and dominance, foreign policy behavior and decisions to go to wars by states has been linked to state strength and hostile propensity where states with considerable military and economic powers are more liable to participate in conflicts and wars compared to others owing to the fact that they are more likely to engage in more foreign crises and foreign transactions29. In addition, foreign policy behavior are informed by balance of power relationships where military parity can deter aggression and alternatively, states can opt for wars with states of equal might than unequal states since between unequal, the weaker state cannot dare to war while the more powerful and stronger state does not need to30. The proximity among states and the number of borders shared by a state plays a significant role in triggering wars31. This is often evidenced in territorial disputes as a means to security and sometimes a means to economic wealth such as national resources. Based on Robert Gilpin’s analysis of war and change in world politics, a state can maintain the status quo, that is, decides not to go into war, when it believes that attempting to change the international systems is not profitable, a state can attempt changing the status quo of international system, through political, territorial and economic expansion when the anticipated gains outweigh the costs32. Despite the varied causes of war and the many reasons why states decides to go to war, the question on the morality of wars still remain with the society being split into two with those advocating for the just wars and those proposing pacifistic approaches to war33. Wars and crises can be justified as discussed by Lebow34. Conclusion The 21st century has seen a fair share of wars from the First World War, The Second World War, The Cold War, the War in Kosovo, War in Iraq, War in Afghanistan, War in Somalia and War in Yugoslavia among others. The causes of war are as diverse as the reasons why nations go into wars. According to Vasquez35, wars begin as a result of escalation of crises when crises are ignited by physical threat to a territory dispute, when the crisis is the third in sequence of crises with same rival, when the hostile interaction spiral occurs in the crises and when the hardliners predominate the leadership on one side. In discussing the quote, the report has identified varied internal and external factors classified under systemic, national attribute, and idiosyncratic that influences foreign policy behavior and explains why states decides to go to war and why behave the way they do. Among these factors are security, aspect of poles and deterrence of nuclear weapons and the aspects of power and dominance. References Bloomfield, L.P & Moulton, A. Managing international conflict: From Theory to policy: a Teaching Tool Using CASCON. London: St. Martin’s Press. 1997. Gartzke, E. Power shuffle: will the coming transition be peaceful? Current history, pp 374- 380, 2009. Holsti, O.R. Theories of international relations. Inis, L., & Claude, J. Just wars: doctrines and institutions. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 1 pp. 83-96, 1980. Keir, L., Press, D.G. The Nukes we need. Foreign Affairs, 88, 6: 39-51, 2009. Lebow, R.N. Between peace and War: the nature of international crisis. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1984. Lebow, R.N. The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism. International Organization, v48 n2 p249-277, 1994. Lebow, R.N. Why Nations Fight: Past and future motives for war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010. Morgenthau. H.J. Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf, In Lebow, R.N. The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism. International Organization, v48 n2 p249-277, 1994. Pearson, F.S. & Rochester, J.M. International Relations: The global condition in the twenty first century. New Jersey: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Vasquez, J. A. The causes of the second world war in Europe: a new scientific explanation. International political science review, Vol 17, No.2 pp1616-171, 1996. Read More