Russias Foreign Policy with Japan - Essay Example

 Russia’s Foreign Policy with Japan This study aims to assess the foreign policy relations between Russia and Japan. According to Trenin(2008) Russia has followed an assertive and reactive foreign policy up to now. Since the financial crash of 1998, the country has grown stronger, with favourable conditions in the energy market contributing to an improvement in its economic position. The country has followed an intelligent macroeconomic policy which is reflected in its slowly growing power on the international stage. Japan: National identity: Some researchers have argued that Japan has not formulated her national identity as one coherent unit but rather as a composite picture containing a multiplicity of discourses, all of which are defined in terms of their relation with various others (Neumann 1996). Tanaka (1993) offers the argument that Russia is an interesting example to be used in analyzing Japan’s development of identity and concept of “self” because Russia does not fall into the category of Japan’s “Orient” self, neither does it fall into the category of Japan’s “West”, both of which are generally the dominant “others” in relation to which Japan’s foreign policy and national identity have been conditioned. As a result, Japan’s relations with Russia conform to a unique pattern which has impacted upon both Japanese and Russian national character. As Hasegawa (2000) has pointed out, Russia has always been relatively unpopular in Japan, especially as compared to other countries such as China and the United States. Bukh (2007) has assessed the contributions made by Japan’s popular novelists, such as Shiba Ryotaro who have dealt exhaustively with the subject of Japan’s history and have been largely responsible for the development of the Japan-Russia discourse. Japan’s national identity has been defined as a positive entity mostly in relation to a negative “other”, in this instance Russia. During the period after the IInd World War, Russia’s increasing industrial strength moved it into a position of strength during the Cold War when the country rapidly evolved to a position of power. In view of the significant problems of poverty and devastation that Japan experienced after the IInd World War and the Pacific War, and Russia’s comparatively more prosperous position, the effort to improve Japan’s position of necessity resulted in Russia being placed in the position of the negative other. Once the Cold War was over and Japan’s economic position began to improve in relation to Russia, the latter still served to define Japan’s identity in relation to a negative “other” because during this period, Russia may have served as a negative “other” symbolizing the evils of communism which had been unsuccessful. Russia has become even more relevant in establishing Japan’s national identity after the latter’s economic recovery began to sustain itself. Since Japan was also on the periphery of international affairs, its adherence to western capitalistic philosophy and its aligning itself with the United States provided it an opportunity to regain some status within the international community as a country aligned with Western international interests. From Russia’s perspective, its policy towards Japan was initially driven by territorial interests when it annexed the northern territories. According to Pikes (1996/7), the foreign policy of any great power is linked to its economy. The root of Russian foreign policy originates in the Bolshevik revolution, wherein Russia was to be merely a springboard from which the Communist revolution and philosophy was to spread to all parts of the world, including the Communist countries. The expansionist policy associated with this belief was the partial cause of Russia’s appropriation of the northern territories. Moreover, Japan’s rejection of Communist philosophies and adoption of the western philosophy has placed the two nations at opposite ends of the spectrum, despite both of them being peripheral nations as further detailed in this report. History of Russia-Japan relations: The history of Russia-Japan relations is largely dominated by the dispute over territory, initiated in 1945 and which has been continuing for seven decades (Sewell, 2009). The disputed area lies along the border of the two countries – southern Kuriles to the Russians and the Northern territories to the Japanese. The interest of both these countries in possessing this territory as a part of their nation first began in the seventeenth century and was a source of continued rivalry between the countries for many years, until it was eventually resolved in a treaty signed in 1875. This tentative peace treaty was however breached during the period of August-September of 1945. At this time, the Soviet Government took the drastic step of unilaterally revoking the pact that had been made with Japan on the northern territories; it invaded Manchuria and occupied it taking about 600 Japanese prisoners of war. Additionally, it also invaded and took over at the same time, about four islands from the Kurile chain, which Japan had claimed to be its territory, but which was unilaterally annexed by the Russians. This attack has influenced Russian-Japanese foreign relations ever since and may be responsible to a large extent, in contributing to the negative perception that the Japanese have towards the Russians. The rancour that resulted from this taking over of the territories persisted up to 1956, when bilateral diplomatic relations were resumed (Carlile, 1994). This followed after the Japanese Government signed a joint agreement with the Russians where in effect, it stated that it could consider compromising on the basis of return of just two of the islands that had been annexed. The Russian involvement in the action to annex the northern territories, coupled with the inherent mistrust that it generated in the Japanese was also responsible for Japan’s siding with the United States during the duration of the Cold War. As Hasegawa (2000) points out, the United States had occupied Okinawa and continued its occupation until 1972, while also maintaining military bases in Japan. The Japanese Conservative Government at the time was also looking for an enemy against whom the ire of the Japanese people could be directed, so that the fervour of nationalism would bring the country together to unite and recover from the political and economic defeat that followed after the Pacific War. By continually highlighting the threat from Russia and the unjustified, unilateral actions of Russia in annexing the northern territories and violating the 1875 treaty, Japanese nationalism was directed away from the United States and towards Russia, so that Russia was perceived as the enemy and this made it much easier for the United States to draw Japan into its side in the Cold War, despite Japan’s geographical proximity to Russia. In the year 1961, Japan renewed its security treaty with the United States and this functioned as the spur for Russia to refuse to acknowledge that a problem existed in respect of the northern territories, which further delayed a resolution. From Japan’s perspective, foreign relations with Russia are thus always shadowed by the war over the northern territories. After the Pacific War, Japan was defeated and devastated and the Soviet Union’s relative prosperity and development as compared to Japan was a source of admiration as well, side by side with the contradictory sentiments against Russia which existed due to the annexation of the northern territories. It has played a significant part in foreign policy relations between the two countries as further detailed below. However, despite the fact that Japan has taken a hard line in so far as the dispute over the northern territories is concerned, this has not impacted upon the development of bilateral economic relations. In effect, during the 1960s and 1970s, the two countries separated the issues of politics and economics. In so far as the prevailing perceptions in the media are concerned, the general discourse on the Russian national character is fragmented. As Watanabe (1948) points out, some of the reporting on the Soviet Union were negative because they comprised the negative experiences of Japanese POW’s in Russia. On an overall basis however, there was admiration in Japan for the industrial progress being made in the Soviet Union that was slowly pushing the country forward into a position of prominence on the international landscape. Japan’s relations with Russia during the period following the war . Economic relations: The strained political relations between the two countries have not greatly impeded the development of economic ties between the two countries, because the advantages offered by geographical proximity and trade possibilities have superseded the political equations. While there was some sporadic trade between the two countries since 1957, the levels were modest and carried on mostly with small and medium sized firms in Japan. During the mid 1960s, big business interests began to get involved and this led to the establishment of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee (JSEC), which became the chief organ that functioned to improve bilateral economic relations between the two countries (Carlile, 1994). The counterpart organization in Russia was the Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee and these two organizations became the major facilitators of bilateral economic trading between the two countries. As Carlile (1994) also points out, administrative arrangements in Russia have been different from Japan; the bureaucratic nature of the Soviet business machine has meant that Japanese companies have had to deal with a centralized bureaucracy, namely the Ministry of Foreign Trade and associated trade organizations. It is important to note that the high levels of interactions that developed on the economic front were separate and distinct from the political relations between the two countries largely because the economic interaction was carried on between Russia and private Japanese companies. Despite the efforts of the Russian Government to get the Japanese Government involved in trade and economic interactions, it nevertheless remained an interaction mainly with private Japanese countries and therefore remained largely distinct from the official Russian foreign policy in relation to Japan. During the period of decline of the Cold War, Japan’s economic position began to improve and there arose a need to refashion Japan’s national identity as a function of its relation with Russia. During the decades of the 60s to the 90s, Japan was slowly rising to become an economic power in the world again; it had recovered from the devastation of the war and had become prosperous in economic terms. Akoi (1999) has argued that in view of Japan’s changing economic position and the political stability that existed in the country, coupled with Japan’s developing closeness with the United States and capitalist philosophy, it resulted in a need for “culture and identity” in Japanese society (Akoi, 1999: 86-122). In the changing course of Japan’s foreign relations with Russia, the respective national identity of the two countries has been fashioned in respect to each other. Russia’s national identity has been constructed as a composite negative of a universal “self”. According to Campbell (1992), Russia’s national identity has developed out of the public discourse perception of what is considered normal and civilized on the one hand and what is considered to be barbarian on the other. He argues that this may largely be a function of Russia’s communist political philosophy, which has been perceived by and presented by the media all over the world as being barbaric. In opposition to the communist philosophy, Japan has drawn closer to the capitalist philosophy of the United States. Moreover, with the prevailing unfavourable view of Russia as the aggressor seizing the northern territories, this has developed into a position where Japan’s national identity is fashioned against Russia. Japan is viewed as the defender of the principles of freedom and democracy embodied in the capitalistic philosophy, and therefore the defender of western civilization with Russia being the negative “other” in relation to Japan. In the international arena, Neumann (1996) has pointed out that Russia has often been viewed as an outsider, while Tanaka (1993) has highlighted the same aspect as relevant also to Japan, which in turn has also been viewed as an outsider on the periphery of the international political arena. As a result, the national identities of the two nations have developed as functions of the other, i.e, Russia has been viewed as the mirror or anti image on the basis of which the image of Japan is constructed. Seikei fukabun: Carlile (1994) points out that most experts in foreign policy relations have highlighted the importance of the dispute over the southern Kurile Islands has contributed to the maintenance of frigid diplomatic relations between the two countries. It has also prevented the development of what could be a lucrative and complementary economic relationship and the underlying implication of the opinions offered by these experts is that unless the northern territories issue is resolved, it will not be possible to deepen the economic relationship. Carlile (1994) on the other hand, has argued that the political relations between the two countries which have characterized foreign policy relations between the two countries does not apply in the economic context and the two are not necessarily connected, they can exist separate and disparate from each other. He refers to this as seikei fukabun. The recent development of “Perestroika” has further strengthened the development of economic ties between the two countries, largely by default. In adopting perestroika, the Russian Government in effect, has acknowledged that the foreign policy initiated by the Bolshevik movement was not a success and the mission to propagate this philosophy all over the world did not achieve the desired objective. It is in essence, an acknowledgement that the capitalistic philosophy of a free market is superior to the communist philosophy and that the illusion of people being happy and equal in a communist society may not be borne out in reality. As a result, Russia has had to modify its foreign relations policy with most countries, including Japan. For instance, the process of transition to a capitalistic society has meant that Russia has needed to acknowledge the power of the free market – a philosophy already adopted by Japan which has aligned itself with the political philosophy of the United States. When Russia annexed the northern territories, it was in a superior industrial and social position as compared with Japan, which was still suffering the devastation following the World War. But by the time the Cold War had ended and by the decade of the Nineties, Japan had advanced far more economically so that it was in a superior position to Russia. As compared to Japan, Russia was in a weaker position in an economic sense, and therefore its foreign relations policy with Japan had to change to allow greater Japanese economic input into the country – the political tensions between the countries generated by the territorial disputes became less important as compared to the economic interaction between the countries. Conclusions: On the basis of the above, it may be noted that Russia’s policy towards Japan may have its basis in the peripheral identity that both nations have maintained in the international arena, despite being close geographical neighbours. The foreign policy that Russia has followed with Japan has been an anti-image of a negative “other”, wherein from a political standpoint, the ideologies and philosophies of the two countries have been opposed to each other. In effect, Japan has largely symbolized those values and political philosophies that are opposed to Russia’s, although it could be argued that by being placed on the periphery of international affairs, both the countries would have naturally gravitated towards each other. It may be noted however, that Russia’s foreign policy for many years was dictated by the aims and goals of the Bolshevik revolution, i.e, that of transferring the Communist philosophy to as much of the world as possible. Japan, being a close neighbour, was a direct candidate for indoctrination; however the territorial dispute over the northern territories did not favourably dispose the Japanese public to accept the Russian political beliefs and ideologies. After the IInd World War, Russia was in a stronger position politically and reports in the Japanese media were largely full of admiration for Russian enterprise and industrial development, despite the suffering inflicted on Japanese POWs after the war. Russia’s foreign policy towards Japan however, did not lean in the same direction as its policy towards China where its Communist philosophy took root. This was largely due to the American presence in Japanese territory and the maintenance of American military bases in Japan. The net result of maintenance of such bases was that the American political influence on Japan was quite substantial, such that Russia was not in a position to override it, especially as Japan began to grow economically stronger day by day by embracing the capitalistic philosophy.The geographical proximity and associated advantages have fostered trade and promoted economic relations between the two countries, with the degree of economic activity increasing from the 60s when business interests in Japan have seized the available opportunities in Russia as the economic activity in Japan has increased. In view of the above, it may be concluded that Russian foreign policy towards Japan has always been adversarial and antagonistic rather than making any serious efforts to pull Japan in as an ally, for two major reasons, Firstly, because of the American influence and presence in Japan, which has automatically placed Japan and Russia on opposite sides in the Cold War. Secondly, because the economic situation of the two countries has been changing after the Second World War; while Russia was more industrially advanced after the war, Japan has been emerging as the economically stronger power while the Russian economy has been deteriorating until perestroika has revived it slowly. During the Cold War, Russia was able to draw many neighbouring countries into its Communist philosophy, including China and Korea; however it was not able to elicit Japan’s cooperation in the same manner. In effect, Russia and Japan have been polarized at opposite ends, with Japan aligning with American philosophy rather than the communist philosophy, thereby generating an uneasy and tense relationship between the two nations, especially due to the hostility generated by the dispute over the northern territories. Russian national identity in relation to Japan is therefore largely existent as the mirror anti-image of Japan, i.e, it portrays a negative image of Japan’s “self”. The element of negativity arises because Russia and Japan have naturally become polarized at opposite ends of the spectrum due to their individual histories and the circumstances surrounding their economic development. Russia followed an aggressive political philosophy with Japan as in the case of the northern territories because of the geographical proximity and the desire to annex territory and impose its Bolshevik philosophy. Japan’s alignment with the Americans has however, proved to be a barrier in the propagation of Russian political philosophy in the country, thereby naturally placing Japan in the position of an adversary. But after the Cold War and its economic difficulties, Russia has been forced to try to capitalize on the economic ties that had existed concurrently between the two nations from the 1960s. This has produced a more conciliatory foreign policy, so that the tensions arising out of the northern territories dispute are being pushed into the background and the economies ties are taking precedence. The present relationship between the two nations is largely based upon a healthy economic interchange and trading between the two countries. As Pipes (1996/7) points out, Japan does not pose any significant military threat to Russia in the manner China does, the power balances in the South east Asian region are being fought out between Russia and China, while Japan has developed into an economic power rather than a political power with the kind of military capability that could pose a threat to Russia. Moreover, subsequent to the Cold War, the economic difficulties have also caused the Soviet Union itself to split up into constituent nations such as Georgia, which further weakened the military and political power of the Soviet Union. Pipes (1996/7) also points out that the future path of Russian foreign policy in relation to the South East Asian countries remains indeterminate. While Russia and Japan were both nations that fell into the periphery from an international perspective in the 1950s, both have come far since then. Japan is less on the periphery now because of its economic strength and is one of the G20 nations. Similarly, the philosophy of perestroika adopted by Russia has reduced the perceptual differences of the country in relation to other Western, capitalistic nations, as a result it is also being integrated better into the new global political scenario where there is a much higher level of interaction and integration between various countries. Russian foreign policy towards Japan has mellowed considerably in the last decade and the levels of economic interaction between the nations have jumped. In terms of retaining power balances in the Asian region, it appears that Russia does have the upper hand while Japan is stronger economically, therefore the rivalry between the two nations has reduced. However, Russian national image in relation to Japan may still be fashioned on the basis of a mirror anti image of Japan, because the philosophies are still opposed, although perhaps not as diametrically as they used to be. References: Aoki, T. (1999). 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CITED IN: “Japan National Identity and Japan-Russia relations”, by Alexander Bukh, Retrieved November 19, 2009 from: archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Bukh-RusJapan-Turin.pdf Read More