The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - Research Paper Example

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) In 1964, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was formed and established as a social revolutionary group with ideologies influenced by Marxism and Leninism and a proclaimed objective to depose the democratic government of Colombia. FARC is the best-armed, strongest, biggest, and oldest guerilla group in Latin America with possibly 12,000 combatants, found largely in the countryside of Colombia, the earliest democracy in South America (Corrales & Romero 98). Although the insurgency no longer maintains the most rigid commitment to these original ideals, the senior members of the group still regard themselves Marxist-Leninist. FARC has waged war against the Colombian government for roughly four decades. At the start of the insurgency, the group had merely more or less 350 soldiers. Majority of these soldiers were the disgruntled and peasants, and they did not have the necessary advanced weaponry (Corrales & Romero 98-99). From this humble beginning, the group’s military capability has risen to roughly 18,000 combatants (Martin 214). Besides its assaults on Colombian economic, political, and military institutions, FARC has been deeply engaged in murder, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, drug trafficking, and other crimes (Hough 386). In fact, the organization becomes more popular for its deep involvement in illegal narcotics businesses than for its rebellious operations. However, its leaders remain devoted to its social revolutionary objectives and uses terrorist methods to terrorize or pressure its political enemies. Even though FARC has been successful in taking over massive portions of Colombian territory, the group has been unsuccessful until now to overpower the Colombian armed forces in open combat (Lee 29). This paper discusses current efforts to combat FARC and speculates as to why they are still successfully active. Current Efforts to Combat FARC The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, headed by Carlo Castano, is a conservative paramilitary organization created in 1984 to fight guerilla soldiers or insurgent groups in Colombia, like FARC. Its exercise of terrorism to abolish the support base of these guerilla militias has made it a dominant and feared army in Colombia (Martin 214). The country’s government since the 1960s has been combatting a number of radical terrorist organizations; the two biggest are the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the FARC (Hough 381). The operations and activities of FARC, alongside the narcotics industry, have given Colombia a quite infamous and perilous reputation. The Colombian army raided a campsite owned by the FARC on the 26th of March 2012, taking the lives of 36 members of the organization and arresting three more. The attack, which Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos stated led to the slaughter of a larger number of FARC supporters than any other counterinsurgency operations in the five-decade-long battle between the FARC and the Colombian government happened immediately after a related operation in Arauca state wherein 12 FARC supporters were arrested and 33 were slaughtered (Lee 33). The attacks were initiated as one of the purposes of a forceful, all-out new Colombian counterinsurgency measure known as the ‘Operation Espada de Honor’, formed to counteract the growing terrorist activities by the guerilla militias in the country. The operation enlarges the number of targets for the Colombian army and the places where they will fight insurgents, with the objective of incapacitating the financial and military capability of FARC (Meacham et al. 23). Operation Espada de Honor is the most recent of the various measures by the Colombian government to crush insurgency in the country. The plan, specifically, is an effort by the government to forcefully weaken the FARC and other insurgent groups in places where the economic interests of Colombia and the guerilla militias coincide. The ultimate objective is to significantly weaken the FARC over the following two years and restrict its capacity to assault the state (Meacham et al. 23-25). This latest plan will keep on targeting the leadership base of the FARC but also widen its target to eradicate the most potent military and economic forces of the group. The Colombian military will also enhance its intelligence domain through the launching of a collective center among all sectors of the national police and the army and considerably enlarge the population of both. Particularly, although the FARC is presently the main aim, the plan also reforms how the government fights what it refers to as ‘bacrim’, or, criminal organizations that arose from the United Defense Front (AUC) (Lee 36-37). It was declared that the military would be heading the campaign against the FARC and other insurgent groups. Why the FARC is still successfully active? Known as one of the longest existing guerilla militias in Latin America, FARC was launched in 1965 as an independent wing of the Colombian Communist party. There are several reasons why the FARC is still alive. Primarily, it has gained massive support from the peasants and it brings together, like other insurgent organizations in Latin America, guerilla strategies and urban terrorism in the rural area (Hough 387). In terms of ideology, FARC identifies itself as a separatist, pro-independence group dedicated to the eradication of American influence and neo-imperialism in the country. FARC resists the privatization of the natural resources of Colombia. FARC rebels have also been successful in occupying lands in parts of Colombia hat have been very hard for the Colombian army to reach. At times the administration in Bogota allowed these land confiscations, which, occasionally, comprised a territory as large as Switzerland (Corrales & Romero 102-4). The FARC insurgents are unusually tough in a military way and have power over huge areas of Colombian lands. The beginnings of the insurgent group are rooted in the purported sovereign republics established primarily by previous Liberal peasant insurgents who had converted into leftist ideologies during the ‘la violencia’—a decade-long civil war in Colombia between the Colombian Liberal Party and the Colombian Conservative Party. Consequently, several republics were established in the course of ‘violencia’ (Meacham et al. 7-8). These were areas of self-protection, independently administered by the peasants, who had built their own army. Protected from the hostility in other parts of the country, these zones became secure refuge for refugees (Meacham et al. 8-10). The strong capability of the FARC has increased massively throughout the 1980s and 1990s, mainly because of the division of the struggle over territory between peasants and local elites in collaboration with criminal organizations. The insurgent group has continuously enlarged its number since the 1980s. As an outcome of its greater military capability, the FARC has repetitively disgraced the Colombian armed forces (Lee 34). One specific humiliation happened in 1997, when the FARC released the soldiers it had imprisoned (Corrales & Romero 106). Hence, because of its continuously strengthening support base, the FARC continues to effectively survive. However, the most important factor ensuring the continued existence of FARC is its financial strength and the assistance it obtains from several foreign sources. The group thrives financially through criminal activities, such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and taxes on narcotics trade. Taxes on the narcotics industry have been especially profitable (Hough 404). Moreover, the FARC acquires ammunition and weapons from different patrons, such as local black market agents. The regional black market provides the group a fairly secure and expedient source of ammunition and weapons and perhaps very hard to prohibit—a dilemma made complicated by the FARC’s exercise of unnecessary supply channels (Hough 404-6). For several decades the group has acquired arms in the countries enclosing Colombia and from Central American countries, where excess arms from rebellions during the Cold War period are accessible on the black market (Martin 214). Such financial strength and easily accessible weapons for the FARC are the most important factors contributing to its survival and successful operations. Conclusions The FARC is a strong insurgent group, which is proven by its continuous survival despite vigorous and aggressive measures from the Colombian government to crush the insurgency. Looking at its history, one will realize that such strength comes from years of strong leadership and success in acquiring large tracts of territory. However, it is the financial strength of the group that most contribute to its continued survival. Without financial capability, any insurgent group, or any organization for that matter, will cease to exist. Works Cited Corrales, Javier & Carlos Romero. United States-Venezuela Relations since the 1990s. UK: Routledge, 2013. Print. Hough, Phillip. “Guerilla Insurgency as Organized Crime: Explaining the So-Called ‘Political Involution’ of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” Politics & Society 39.3 (2011): 379-414. Print. Lee, Chris. “The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?” Latin American Perspectives 39.1 (2012): 28-42. Print. Martin, Gus. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2012. Print. Meacham, Carl, Douglas Farah, & Robert Lamb. Colombia: Peace and Stability in the Post-Conflict Era. UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Print. Read More