The IRA and the British Army - Assignment Example

221239 The IRA had to negotiate peace as the British Army had effectively defeated it’. Discuss. The following essay will discuss the validity or otherwise of the claim that the ‘IRA had to negotiate peace as the British Army had effectively defeated it’ as the chief factor in the IRA cease fire of 1997. The Irish Problem has been around in one form or another since the twelve century, when the English first invaded Ireland. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was originally formed with the objective of forcing the British out of Ireland completely to form a united Irish Republic. The IRA succeeded in driving the British out of the majority of Ireland except for the six most Protestant counties of Ulster. The Provisional IRA were formed as a breakaway from the main IRA in 1969 as a response to the emergence of the Troubles. From 1969 to 1994 the Provisional IRA and the British security forces fought each other in what the former dubbed the Long War. The war the IRA waged using the tactics of Michael Collins forced the British government to peace talks and the partition of Ireland. The British called the IRA terrorists whilst the Republicans referred to them as freedom fighters. The IRA did not gain independence for all of Ireland just 26 counties. The Ulster Protestants in Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom whilst Civil War broke out in the Irish Free State leading to the deaths of Michael Collins and Arthur Griffiths amongst others.1 Despite public statements to the contrary even hard-line republicans such as Eamon de Valera accepted the partition.2 Sinn Fein and IRA ever since have been wary of halting their military campaigns in case of splitting the Republican movement, even when the British army appeared to be gaining the upper hand.3 The temporary partition of Ireland back in 1921 had showed that neither the British or the Irish Republicans could gain total victory, a similar situation that the Provisional IRA found itself in the early 1990s. The Ulster Protestants were content with having Home Rule in Northern Ireland and denying Roman Catholics their civil rights and any real political influence. The Roman Catholic minority in Northern Ireland felt let down by the Republic of Ireland for not fighting for a united Ireland and uninterested in a state they did not want to belong to and did nothing to protect their rights. Despite making a claim to aim towards a united Ireland in its constitution, the Irish Republic left Northern Ireland alone. As for the Republican campaigns of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s they were ineffective. The harsh economic climate of the depression of the 1930s did more to set off sectarian violence than radicalism. The 1960s were to witness a change of attitude amongst the nationalist and republican communities that resulted in the civil rights movements, a violent backlash from the Unionists. The British Army was brought in to stop sectarian violence yet provided the Provincial IRA with a reason to launch a long running armed struggle. In part the civil rights movement had been encouraged by the attempted political, social and economic reforms of Northern Irish Prime Minister ONeill, with similar aims of ending discrimination against Catholics. The events of 1969 seemed to catch all sides by surprise. The Provisional IRA had tended to target police and security forces or their civilian contractors. Their attacks were aimed at gaining or forcing concessions from the British or Irish and Spanish governments respectively. During the Long War with Britain, the IRA found that attacks that resulted in higher civilian casualties such as those at Guildford or Birmingham did not promote their cause but only strengthened the resolve of the British government.4 Perhaps if the large shipment of Semtex, rocket launchers and heavy machine guns aboard the Eskund had reached the IRA in 1987 it could have blitzed the British out of Northern Ireland.5 ** On 31 August 1994 the Provisional IRA announced a "complete cessation of military operations". The statement was greeted by widespread celebrations in nationalist areas. But unionists and the Major government quickly and astutely pointed out that there was no explicit promise that the truce was permanent.6 The Provisional IRA had in reality decided to test whether it could gain more concessions from calling a halt to its longstanding military campaign than continuing the Long War. The first cease fire was an admission that there was a stalemate rather than an impending military victory for the British army. "We believe that an opportunity to create a just and lasting peace has been created," the statement said. "We note that the Downing Street Declaration is not a solution - a solution can only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations." 7 UK Prime Minister John Major said that the statement was "very welcome indeed" but complained that it should be "clear and unambiguous" that violence was over for good. DUP leader Ian Paisley went further saying that the cease fire statement was an "insult to the people [the IRA] has slaughtered because there was no expression of regret".8 Loyalist paramilitaries believed that a secret deal had been agreed between Britain, the Republic of Ireland and the IRA / Sinn Fein. The Loyalists thus stuck to a "wait and see" policy with regard to the cease fire. There was a reluctance to believe that the Troubles had finally come to an end, as the British army had not overwhelmingly defeated the IRA.9 The unwillingness of the British government and the Ulster Unionists to make deals with Provisional Sinn Fein undermined the truce and reinforced the arguments of the IRA hard liners that wanted to return to the armed struggle. The cease fire lasted all of 17 months, before the IRA hard liners were able to restart the Long War. They did so with devastating consequences on 9 February, 1996. The IRA returned to its armed struggle when it planted a huge bomb in Londons Docklands district. The bomb killed two people, and it injured more than 100 people, as well as causing more than £85m of damage.10 The Provisional IRA not only retained the capacity to bomb the British mainland, it made staunch Republican areas such as South Armagh very dangerous places for the British armed forces.11 The next Provisional IRA cease fire would not be put into place until 20 July, 1997, three months after the election of the New Labour government. New Labour, which unlike John Majors minority Conservative administration did not have to rely on the parliamentary support of the Ulster Unionists, had effectively made it clear that Provisional Sinn Fein would be allowed to participate in peace talks – on the precondition that the cease fire was restored. The Sinn Fein leadership persuaded the IRA command that laying down its arms was better than carrying on fighting, as New Labour was more likely to offer them concessions.12 In the eleven years following the second cease fire, the future of the IRAs weaponry has been one of the dominant and unresolved issues of the peace process.13 The British army, and the police as well as the Ulster Unionists were well aware that the Provisional IRA was still a potent paramilitary force at the time of its second cease fire.14 Republicans have argued that the arms can only be dealt with as part of a solution that leads to "all the guns being removed from Irish politics" -giving equal weight to IRA weapons and the presence of the British military.15 In May 2000, as part of a comprehensive deal to kick start the stalled Northern Ireland Assembly, the IRA issued a statement offering to take part in a process in which its arms would be placed "completely and verifiably beyond use".16 Since May 2000, the Provisional IRA has opened up some of its arms dumps to international inspectors who, on each and every occasion, have gone on to confirm that the weaponry inspected was militarily beyond use at that time.17 The Provisional IRA decided to stop fighting, it did not have to do so, and could have carried on with the armed struggle for decades longer.18 Bibliography Barker A, (2004) Shadows: Inside Northern Ireland’s Special Branch Boyce D G, (1996) The Irish Question and British Politics 1868-1996 English, R. Armed Struggle History of the IRA (2003) Macmillan Ltd, London Fitzpatrick, D (1998) The Two Irelands 1912-1939, Oxford University Press, Oxford Harden T (1999) Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armagh Read More