The Role of the State in Industrial Relations - Personal Statement Example

 The Role of the State in Industrial Relations To what extend and why does the role of the state in industrial relations differ – an analysis of US, France, Germany and Britain Introduction & Background ‘Employee Relations’ is comparatively a new term which widens the research studies of industrial relations to take account of wider portions of the employment sector that differ from each other ‘actor’, consisting of non-unionized places of work, individual agreements and socio-economical, rather than contractual, actions. Ron Bean conducted a survey on industrial relations and found it rather ‘pluralist-institutionalist’ approach which is particularly predominant in these countries (1994, p.2). However industrial relations between these countries are widely recognized as one of the major components of the business systems and the distinctive, structural features they stamped to different other economies that have been broadly analyzed. References to the past of IR system are certainly far less influential than they intended to be. The once hardly uncertain links between the development of labour laws and the socio-economical prevalence of the manager has lost much of its plausibility. In fact, the reinvention of ‘independent contracts’ is directly linked with often emphatically expressed doubts about the employees’ need of security, particularly in view of obvious changes in earnings, the opaque social security set-up and the pervasive, sometimes even legally surefire trade unions movement (Teubner 1987, p. 130). . The role of the states in Industrial Relations (IR) The state plays a significant role in determining the legal environment within which employment relations are considered as an actor of IR system. Industrial relations vary, to some extent till they count on government legislation to resolve the measures of ‘collective bargaining’, to settle the substantive provisions for ‘employment’ and to resolve conflicts (Ron 1994, p. 103). In the U.S., the regulation has noticeably been prominent in forming the IR system, regulating the plans and strategies of bargaining, although less reliance has bee put on legislation to fix extensive service conditions (p. 103). However, in Germany, the law has assumed a central importance and extensive influence in the relations between capital and labour, partly due to pressures from the collective bargaining parties (p. 103). In France, the ‘Collective Agreements Act’ of 1950 provided an all-inclusive official framework for collective bargaining (p. 103). In Britain until the 1970s IR system was less synchronized by law than other Western countries since there was an enduring practice of ‘voluntarism’ and self-sufficiency by the parties which had become part of the British cultural inheritance (p. 103). As Ron (1994) suggests most IR theory recognizes the limitations on state actions due to the power of other ‘actors’. Independent power can be achieved either through high degrees of concentration through a small number of large firms and large unions (in Germany) or potentially low independent power can be compensated through a large number of small and medium sized employers (as in Germany) and unions (in Britain) acting through associations to compensate for their relative individual powerlessness (The State, p7). There are perhaps some desires to use the comparative studies for practical experience, or to use the IR systems of particular country which can demonstrate lack of higher success possibilities within the society – by means of rapid ‘rates of economic growth’ or an absence of serious industrial conflict – as ‘models’ to follow and possibly adopt (p.5). Today’s involvement recalls the historical influence of Hugh Clegg, Bill McCarthy, and Allan Flanders, when industrial relations were a striking option for academics (Acken & Wilkinson 2003, p. xv). This shows a strapping return of unions although, thanks to the recent slump in these economies, some special effects of Employment relations remain at risk (p. xv) – as unions are united under a single restoration policy, that is, worn to shreds between the claims of adversarial management mixture and agility in bridge-building way of business and management (p. xv). In Latin America, for instance, they have tended to regulate everything through legislation or decree. But since eighties, as Ron (1994) suggests, Latin American governments have been achieving more tripartite agreements through social dialogues. Thus in nineties, Chile concluded a central agreement to define a structure for collective and economic development, and Mexico since 1987 has had an annually renewed “pact for economic solidarity”, in the Dominican Republic in 1994: both State and Church mediated a settlement between employers and trade unions in export processing zones, which could be “a twist in the IR scene in Latin America, moving away from confrontation and government interference” (The State, p.11) United State’s, as discussed above, organizing strategy rocketed but there are some doubts – as recent blow has confirmed that unions has still not run its way yet (p. xv). In Britain, however, the image of unionization is bleak; its serration seems certainly low when differentiated with the other economic giants (p. xv). But the panorama of new legal gratitude process, with inspirational early 1990s posture of public policy, will surely interpret into more than major gains in EU membership (p. xv). However, the elimination of smaller organizations in 2005 has been criticized by the unions as a possible urge to unified relationship and collective bargaining (p. xv). The labour market of Germany is characterized by “standard industrial relations”, which is organized as a complete set of characteristics, and, contrastingly, standard employment in France is rested on the employment union of tentative period (Kroos 2005, p7). In both countries labour market structure relies on self-styled standard employment relations – that is, this recalls a structure of industrial relations which was extended during the ‘Golden Era’ of higher economic development and permanent interests of state development, and which is linked to a normative attitude on how such relations should be designed (p.8). At one side standard industrial relations entail higher levels of safety measures by labour laws and collective agreements; and, on the contrary, they are directly allied to the collective protection system (p.8). However, this framework of industrial relations is increasingly seen as “paralyzed labor marketplaces” in spite of the demands that stem from absolute globalization and socio-economic changes. Regulation of collective bargaining In a cross-national perspective, how legal intervention in the bargaining process and the scope, to which collective bargaining system was established and entrenched, remained weak. Historically speaking, the objective of government involvement – once unions had been granted legal status – was in general to endorse collective bargaining (Glegg 1976) (p. 104).” “Rimlinger (1977), in his comparative analysis of the Britain, the United States and France argued that state relations with the labour movement have experienced a similar past growth, going from a preliminary phase of repression of employees’ organizations and collective act on the verge of industrialization, to one of toleration and support, followed by a period of broader ruling of employees’ privileges by the state. Similarly, Jacobs (1986) come to a conclusion that using a broader model of European states. As a result of variations in current socio-economic environment, with the extent and pace of industrialization process, this common fruition has taken a noticeably distinctive shape which each of the three countries requires much concentration (Bean 1994, p. 104). Likewise in Britain, as Ron argued, the role of the state was that of implementation of a legal framework required for the running of the marketplace, specific pieces of constitutional legislation such as the “Combination Acts” were used to inhibit unionism, and the common law was typically implacable as opposed to union activities (p.105). The purpose of legal punishments in no way precluded the continuance of trade unions, and after the 1820s the state no longer considered serious efforts at further repression (p. 105). The Scandinavian states, where the later growth of industrialization had not allowed the long-standing prevalence of independent craft unionism. Trade unions have gotten and preserved considerable bargaining power in key sectors of the Britain’s economy. They never raised a movement for legal, procedural interference as a mechanism of supporting collective bargaining. The most important rationale behind seems to be the huge parts of manufacturing industries, mainly the trades and coal mining; the union campaigns had received plenty of industrial power and got bargaining reputation before annexation of the permit after 1950s and the successive expansion of union political influence (p. 105). As Kahn-Freund showed that in Britain (1850-1906) the connection between law and IR system in the ‘formative period’ was only one of its kinds owing to the following conditions found in no other comparable labour movements: that Labour movement was pretty powerful; trade unions lacked legal support; and trade union laws were set up prior to universal male franchise (Wedderburn 1983:37) (Ron 1994, p. 106).” According to Hyman (1975), in Britain, the lenient policy itself came to be interpreted again, to entail those unions and industry managers should keep their relations with no less than state involvement. Finding suitable actions which could be compulsory and which would not be harmful (Phelps Brown 1959). The IR system in Britain continued to be carried out mainly on the basis of unpaid collective bargaining without permissible force on either side, and put into practice through unenforceable contracts (Ron 1994, p106-107). Both countries, U.S. and Britain, have played their role in contemporary economic expansion at least several decades in front of Western Europe and in the United States, on the contrary to much of Europe; it was principally the common law relatively than the governing body which described the constitutional rights of employees. In Britain, legislative body would mediate at critical times, when it was pressurized politically, to reaffirm the constitutional rights of employees after conventional court verdicts had damaged them, whereas in the USA constitutional laws swallowing IR system were sparser (p. 107). In essence, the Depression of the 1930s has a main impact in changing the typical weather of public attitude and in encouraging state interference in favor of union groups and collective bargaining. Asymmetrical bargaining power between managers and disordered employees (or weak unions) had not only heartened labour turbulence but actually provoked the Depression, by plummeting and subverting salary rates and so limiting purchasing influence (p. 108). The widespread legal structure set up and sheltered employee rights to systematize and negotiate collectively by the proscription of certain forms of management demeanor as ‘unfair labour practices’ and it finished with the code of restricted account, whereby one union would hand out as the sole envoy for all workers in the authorized bargaining unit, and ‘majority rule’ for selecting the representative (p. 108). Given that nearly all contracts are being discussed between the two enterprises, there was little reason to call for the contribution of state organizations (p. 109). In sharp contrast to other countries, France played an insignificant role. Throughout the nineteenth century, state action towards labour movement was particularly authoritarian. Recognition was accorded only to the right of union and not to the right to negotiate. State interference started to emerge sometimes, if serious, industrial clashes so that state mediators in neighboring areas would not only aim to encourage intercession but also persuade managers to talk. In addition, in the bigger social predicaments, ‘the nationwide government mediated so as to resolve conflicts whose strength and violent behavior could have had critical political results (Ron 1994, p. 109-110). Even if the new legislature gave the ‘most representative’ unions the right to negotiate, it was in fact the state rather than the employees using a vote, as in the US, that settled on which groups were the most representative. The legislation on union recognition did not accept the rule of most, nor did it accept the code of restricted union illustration, on account of ideological differences within the labour association (p. 110). In a nutshell, the French officious and bossy approach towards industrial relations imitates noticeably the French explanations of the restrictions of both private and public sectors, explanations that “without human intervention” made the state a prospective party to any contracts parleyed between managers and labour unions (Sewell 1977:229).”1 Contrasting Britain, the United States and France reflect basic socio-economical disparities and the individualistic power policies and premeditated options of the unions, in conjunction with an exacting historical conjuncture of measures and events (p. 111). In spite of its current receptiveness towards transference of IR system in Germany is largely derived from a successful model of social governance which is still vastly valued by the “collective cohorts”. It is noticeable by central unions and managers’ associations, corporatist management, an orientation towards agreement and limited potential of state involvement. Shortening the differntiative relations of Germany, France, U.S., and Britain IR system, one might come to a conclusion that the main differences between their modes of social governance prevail. In conjunction with the limits of state interference intended to make a previously non-successful system a successful private-sector collective bargaining, is exactly the case of France. Collective bargaining was started in that nation with great intricacy on account of managers’ opposition, partially in return to the intolerance of unions such as the CGT (Sellier 1978).”2 Employee relations as an activity between these states In these countries, the employee relations normally depends upon the existence of formalities set by the particular firms and organizations which served the only purpose of clarifying what was predictable for employee relationship. “The stretchy moves and empowerment of employees has responded in ‘fuzzier’ limitations between the performances that are required and are considered as ‘inapt’ (Price 2004). Employees – mostly the employers – have been given greater discretion on managerial processes in these countries. Nearly all big organizations in these countries continue to have strict rules and regulations on: Punctuality, absence, wellbeing and Security, Gross law-breaking, the usage of corporation conveniences, and discrimination (Price 2004). However the implementation of such legal measures is a one-sided issue, entailing some sort of reserved legal system. Ruling is not only repellent, in the very sense of being collective, or protective; it also makes a hopeful involvement to the overall performance of organizations. It has been a widespread impression, particularly in Germany, that a successful business cannot continue to survive if its employees conduct themselves in a messy manner (Price 2004). Arrangement in a business relies on a proper invention of each one of these types of regulations. If we see in the particular context of human resource management (HRM), comparatively, the stress has recoiled from executive regulation towards individuals and, in particular, to group management. Yet, most businesses continue to have institutionalized punitive dealings, normally established by the management (Price 2004). A cursory look at these nations is of particular interest with regard to the relationship between the two employees, as it pours the shadow on how these two nations with diverse organizational backgrounds are becoming accustomed to widespread and common European guiding principles. According to Ron, France is perhaps still the most inaccessible of the bigger European states. Germany has its “associates” in the U.S., but only bits of the plentiful industrial relations contest and studies in France divulge into Anglo-Saxon literature (Bean, R, 1994, p9). Some broad results seeping from the employees’ relations of these countries are: in Britain, employee relations systems can be examined largely as an expertise or as a stance, comparatively than as a managing purpose or exact area of actions as in Germany; the idea of ‘standard employment’ relations is more prevalent in Germany and U.S. as comparable to France (Kroos, D, 2005, p6); The stress of industrial relations extends to move from 'cooperative' groups, for example trade unions and ‘collective bargaining’, to the union with individual employees. Conversely, workers’ and employees’ viewpoints have changed slightly over the time. According to Ron (1994), somewhat, it is only in the community sector of these states that trade unions keep hold of a gauge of their ex-strength and power in their places of work (The State, 2008, p6). Trade Union pressure in the private sector, on the other hand, continues to hurl regrets. The principal areas of the Britain’s private sector where industrialized ‘disputes’ are still experienced from time to time, for instance, public transportation, are only for those where there’s a patent public or political awareness and/or the management is observed as the decisive ‘backer’. Dialogues on employment conditions presume the likelihood of incongruities occurring. Even where a contract has been made and relations between management and employees normalized at the level of the job, complaints are predictable. Third-party mediation procedures would be both helpful and required to help settle disputes with a view to the evasion of industrial procedures. This could happen via judicial resolution by means of courts of law in the case of those contracts with legally obligatory rules, or by state-sponsored pacification, intervention and controlled adjudication for these and other kinds of labour disputes (Ron 1994, p. 121-122).” Conclusion From the above discussion, we have come to a conclusion that the idea of engagement between employees is helpful in encouraging wider concentration in the dimension of human resource outputs, counting through the extensive use of employees’ approaches studies and in routine management systems of these countries. It is no doubt that the commitment puts forward executives a methodical framework for watching a series of historical indicators, counting on the attitudes and behaviors of the industrial relations, of the status of the employees association. But ahead of that, it corresponds to a desire that employees must be aware of, make someone believe and entrust themselves to the goals of the organizations in which they are working. Why this is important for the employee relations professionals? It is important and being more premeditated and visualizing the ‘bigger picture’. It is equivalent to that of being conversant in an extensive range of methods and abilities, together with arbitration and infrastructure. But, in the end, it is also equivalent in declaring more powerfully the interests of “employee relations” and program in these countries. It is exactly their conditions that stop a correct investigation of the jurisdiction process. By concentrating on the unionization, collective labour law is overvalued and individual labour law absolutely undervalued. Labour laws began with lawmaking procedures, and still are mostly wrought by legal provisions. With each obligatory rule the governing body adapts the series of collective bargaining too. Providing the regular interaction between substantive legal rules and routine mechanisms is not allowed, neither the conditions of labour nor the range of collective action can be appropriately valued. Bibliography (References) Bean, R. (1994). Comparative Employees Relations: an introduction to cross-national perspectives, 2nd Edition, Thomson Learning, London. Bhopal, M. (2008). MP3002 Comparative Employee Relations Week 4: The State, London Metropolitan Business School, London Metropolitan University. Acken, P. & Wilkinson, A. (2003). Understanding work & Employment: Industrial relations in transition, Oxford University Press Inc, New York. Hyman, R. (1975). Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction. London: MacMillan. Teubner, Gunther. (1987). Juridification of Social Spheres: A comparative analysis in the areas of labour, corporate, antitrust and social welfare law. Labour Laws and Legislation, pp. 130 Kroos, D. (2005). Concept of standard employment in Germany and France: the role of industrial relations, Cevipof, SciencesPo, Paris. Accessed April 23, 2008 from http://www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr/rencontres/jours/200509-ante/palier/clegg/YR_papers/Kroos.pdf Bryson, A. (2005). Union effects on employee relations in Britain, The Tavistock Institute, SAGE publications, London, Thousand Oaks CA. Accessed April 24, 2008, from http://www.psi.org.uk/pdf/brysonHRclimatefinal.pdf Price, A. (2004). Human Resource Management in a Business Context, 2nd Edition, Based on Chapter 23, published by Thomson Learning. Accessed April 25, 2008 http://www.hr-topics.com/employee_relations/conflict_bargaining_involvement_wellbeing.htm Read More