Strategic Horizons: Americas Failed Strategy in the Islamic World, by Steven Metz - Research Paper Example

?Short Paper: Strategic Horizons: America’s Failed Strategy in the Islamic World, by Steven Metz. Part I Introduction In this paper, I will provide asummary and analysis of Strategic Horizons: America’s Failed Strategy in the Islamic World by Steven Metz. Metz provides a critique of the U.S. strategies toward Islamic extremism and argues that the latest strategy is in principle no different from previous strategies. As such, just as the last strategy failed, the latest strategy is also failing and the time has now come for the U.S. to regroup and revise its Islamic extremism strategy. Part II Summary Metz begins his article by observing that anti-Americanism in the Islam world is spreading throughout the Middle East reflecting that the U.S. strategy toward Islamic extremism is failing. Metz points out that prior to September 11, 2001, the U.S. focused on partnering with and fostering relationships with Islamic leaders regardless of how tyrannical they may have been. However, since September 11, the U.S. came to the realization that his strategy did not work with respect to controlling Islamic extremism. The U.S. then adopted a counterinsurgency-type strategy. This strategy was a double-edged sword in that it simultaneously targeted fighting terrorism itself and sources of support for terrorists. Former President Bush took the position that Islamic extremism grew out of a lack of political and economic participation although Al-Qaida was led by individuals who were not short on opportunities for economic and political participation. Bush would promote the concept that democratic and economic reforms and strategies would root out support for terrorism. While Obama agreed with Bush’s strategy in principle, he argued that the approach was too severe and thought partnership and a cooperative approach was more desirable. Obama’s approach was more or less based on paying lip service to a perception that Americans and Muslims wanted the same thing: peace, security and prosperity. Regardless, Metz argues that despite what might appear to be different approaches by Bush and Obama, they are both based on the same concept: democratic reforms. Both strategies assume that democracy is the solution to extremism. The reality is democratic rules are averse to quelling opposition, particularly when the public outrage is not directed at them, but abroad. Moreover, technological advances has made it easier for public rage to spread and more difficult for any government to control. For governments in the Islamic world, it has become a lot easier and far less expensive to simply allow public displays of hostilities toward the U.S. to die of natural causes. Metz also argues that while Islamic governments have taken the initiative to implement democratic reforms, very few have followed through with the necessary economic reforms. Therefore the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy advocating for economic and political reforms as a means of eradicating support for extremism and terrorism cannot work without the necessary economic reforms. Metz also points out that the gap between the U.S. and the Islamic world will not be closed by proposing greater respect and careless speeches about unity when in reality, U.S. display of power and priorities reflects otherwise. For example, the U.S.’s close relationship with Israel clearly demonstrates a lack of respect for the Islamic world. Metz suggests that the U.S. strategy for economic and political reforms and the latest call for respect toward the Islamic world is perceived as a weakness and may not garner respect in return. At the same time, the hard ball played by the Bush administration was similarly met with anti-Americanism from the Islamic world. While it is necessary to continue to fight terrorism itself as it has made America safer, it is time to rethink strategies for fighting the underlying causes of terrorism and support for terrorism. Part III Analysis Metz view of U.S. strategies toward Islamic extremism is based on an oversimplification of how the U.S. views the problem of Islamic extremism. Certainly, the U.S. strategy of directly fighting terrorism can be taken at face value: an attempt to improve homeland security. However, the broader strategy of compelling political and economic reform is not merely an attempt to fight the root causes of terrorism and support for terrorism. As noted by Metz, this strategy makes little sense since Al-Qaeda was led by political and economically influential individuals. Certainly, I do not believe that this fact is also lost on the Islamic world. Therefore, in my opinion, anything that Obama or any former president says publically about unity, respect, cooperation and partnership will only be seen as nothing more than paying lip service to a disingenuous Islamic extremism policy. I believe that hostilities toward the U.S. may very well be related to what appears to be a disingenuous strategy, not simply because the strategies are inherently weak as Metz contends. I think the solution is for the U.S. to adopt a strategy that it can be honest about or at the very least be honest about its current strategy. As Yazdani suggests, the U.S. strategy with respect to the Islamic world has always been guided by an attempt to root out threats to U.S. hegemony. This strategy took “shape in the Cold War age and has continued in the post-Cold War era”.1 In other words, the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is not failing because it is incorrect, but simply because it is not perceived as a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, but an excuse for promoting U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East: regional and global hegemony. In my opinion, Metz’s contention that in essence, the U.S. has persistently adopted a strategy of cooperation and partnership toward the Islamic world is also misleading. For example, Yazdani points out that the U.S. has been very inconsistent with respect to its strategies toward the Islamic world. For example, the U.S. has forged relationships with despots in the Middle East, while at the same time bombing other states such as Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and so on. In the meantime, the U.S. has demonstrated significant bias toward Israel while attempting to forge relationships with its main adversaries. In this regard, I think that it is not so much that the U.S. has adopted a weak counterinsurgency strategy as Metz contends. Rather, I think the problem is the U.S.’s strategy is contradictory and speaks to a broader U.S. foreign policy and not specifically toward counterinsurgency. A report released by the Defense Science Board, an advisory panel to the Pentagon made observations that are consistent with both Metz and Yazdani’s arguments. Like Metz, the Defense Science Board warned that the U.S. strategy toward Islamic extremism is flawed and does not effectively dissuade Islamic extremism. Like Yasdani, the Defense Science Board cautioned that the U.S. strategy toward Islamic extremism is based on a Cold War strategy. However, the Defense Science Board does not argue as Yasdani did, that the U.S. strategy is based on promoting U.S. hegemony. Instead, the Defense Science Board takes the position that the U.S. seeks to convince Muslims that they are oppressed in much the same way that they attempted to convince Russians that they were oppressed by the Soviet Union’s Communism. The only difference is that the U.S. is not attempting to “contain a threatening state empire” instead, the U.S. is attempted to “convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity” which is an “agenda hidden within the rubric of a ‘War on Terrorism’”.2 It therefore follows that the U.S. strategy toward the Islamic World and Islamic extremism is not particularly truthful. Rane, like Metz point out that Obama said all the right things in articulating his strategy toward the Islamic World: partnership, respect and so on. However, Rane points out that Obama spoke of being truthful with each other. This is ironic since the U.S., according to Shanker and Yazdani, has not been truthful about its strategy toward the Islamic world. Rane, like Shanker and Yazdani also doubts the authenticity of the U.S. strategy relative to the Islamic world. According to Rane, the U.S. is focused on accomplishing its own goals: oil flows “from the Middle East and the security of Israel”.3 Therefore, while Metz criticises the U.S. strategy toward the Islamic world on its merits, there is reason to believe that the strategy is not a genuine strategy with flaws, but rather a disguise for achieving other U.S. goals. Part IV Conclusion In this paper, I provided a summary of Metz’s article Strategic Horizons: America’s Failed Strategy in the Islamic World and analysed his arguments. Metz treats the U.S. strategy toward the Islamic World as a genuine strategy and one that fails on its merits. I analysed Metz’s arguments by reference to other recorded critiques of the U.S. strategy toward the Islamic world. I therefore concluded that the U.S. strategy toward the Islamic world is not failing because of its inherent weakness, but as a result of its disingenuous goals: to further the U.S.’s own economic and political goals in the international community. Bibliography Metz, Steven. “Strategic Horizons: America’s Failed Strategy in the Islamic World.” World Politics Review, (19 September 2012). Rane, Halim. Islam and Contemporary Civilisation. Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, (2010). Shanker, Thom. “U.S. Fails to Explain Policies to Muslim World, Panel Says.” The New York Times, (November 24, 2004). http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/24/politics/24info.html?pagewanted=print&position= (Assessed April 23, 2013). Yazdani, Enyatollah. “US Policy Towards the Islamic World.” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 7(2&3), (Summer & Fall 2008): 37-46. Read More