Chinese Navy Expansion and the US Hegemony in Asia - Research Proposal Example

Running head: CHINESE NAVY HEGEMONY How Does The Expansion Of The Chinese Navy Affect U.S. Hegemony In Asia? of essay’s Class name Date assignment is due Abstract China’s Gross Domestic Product growth rate over the past two decades has been phenomenal and if it continues even at a slightly slower pace, it could exceed the GDP of the United States by 2020. It is highly possible that China might convert the economic power into diplomatic and military power. Given China’s run-ins with the US and Japan, incursions into the Spratly Islands, domination of Tibet and a many other assertive behaviours, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether or not the continued economic growth and expansion of the Chinese Navy will affect U.S. hegemony in Asia. This thesis will employ a China-centric approach, classical strategic literature and strategic trends analyzed so as to uncover the grand strategy that China has and other clues that may indicate hegemonic ambitions. These findings will then be corroborated with an analysis of current day events. Proposed Research Questions The key research question of the thesis is; will China’s economic rise lead to increasing hegemonic tendencies? Several secondary questions are posed in order to be able to answer this question. The first question is what characteristics point to a state with hegemonic tendencies? This will form the basis with which China’s past and present actions and policies could be studied. The next questions are; has China stated hegemonic intentions implicitly or explicitly and does China’s actions post-1978 suggest hegemonic tendencies? These two questions will provide a China-centric insight of the analysis while grounding it to reality at the same time. The last question that is required to argue the thesis is whether it is likely that a hegemonic strategy emerges to be or continues to be the technique used by China’s leadership in the next twenty to thirty years. Tertiary questions related to the investigation of China’s intentions are whether or not there are historical precedents for a hegemonic China and if so, what are the tendencies of a hegemonic China like? Definitions Robert Gilpin explained a hegemonic state to be a single powerful state that dominates or is in control or lesser states in the system (Robinson, 1996, pp. 82-128). While a hegemonic state is often imperialistic, there are different ways that a state arrives at its position of power. Military force needs not be used by a hegemonic state to establish a position of power (Schmitt, 2009, pp. 127-162). However, military superiority is often a characteristic of a hegemonic state. For example, many scholars concur with the opinion that the United States of America is a hegemonic country as much as its influence is not mainly derived from military conquests (Yŏnguso, 2006, pp. 153-182). In this paper, the author has used hegemonic tendencies to refer to China’s rising power to gain for itself a strong position internationally where it could dominate or control lesser states. This includes challenging the United States and re-ordering the regional and global system in its favour. The attributes of a rising power with hegemonic objectives will be dealt with in greater depth in the thesis. Limitations This thesis used public information available through translations provided on the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), electronic databases and the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) (Thompson, 1999, pp. 135-172). Sources from Chinese leaders and authors were used where possible when ascertaining attitudes and motives behind Chinese actions. On the other hand, because of the reserved nature of the Chinese government, limitations were faced in obtaining the desired information. Without documents recording China’s internal deliberations, there was need for further analysis to reconcile reality and rhetoric. Some degree of extrapolation and speculation was therefore necessary. Delimitations The aim of the study is to understand China’s strategy in expanding its Navy and whether pursuing a hegemonic approach is in fact a likely course of action. In looking for precedents, the study was confined to the expansion of the Chinese Navy. China’s growing Navy possesses substantial power when compared to the states around it. China has been exerting herself on the world stage in respect to exporting China’s brand of communism. By studying China’s current day Navy expansion and actions the paper has helped in determining whether China exhibits hegemonic characteristics. China’s naval events since 1978 till present have been examined (Camilleri, 2007, pp. 47-72). The year 1978 is significant because it corresponds to a period in time when Deng Xiaoping became China’s paramount leader who led the country into economic modernization (Ross, 1999, pp. 81-118). Significance of the study The self-confidence of US hegemony over US Pacific is being challenged. It is being driven by the decline of imperial America and the rise of China as a Pacific power. The first assumption is controversial but there is a growing view among some of the foremost thinkers in the world that the American empire is now in inevitable decline and that the US era of hegemony in the Asia-Pacific will end. The only choice that Washington has is to try and save itself by slashing defence spending. This Pacific retreat will not be voluntary but will be compelled by financial pressures as the world superpower totters under the burden of its 1.47 trillion dollars deficit which is now equal to 10 percent of GDP (Tahir-Kheli, 1998, pp. 996-1012). The second assumption is undeniable. China is working ardently to create a navy and a land-based anti-ship missile system that will stop the US 7th Fleet from controlling its territorial waters. Recently, Niall Ferguson who is a Harvard economist delivered a harsh warning about the imperial decline that is a concern to great powers that are no longer able to manage their economies (Bundy, Burns & Weichel, 1994, pp. 67-94). While giving the John Bonython Lecture at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, Ferguson cautioned that the US economy is now so caught up in debt that Washington can only try to save itself by slashing defence spending. The US is on a totally unsustainable fiscal course with no clear political means of self-correcting (Wiarda, 1996, pp. 182-205). Expenses by the military are the item most likely to be squeezed to compensate because unlike compulsory entitlements such as social security, defence spending is discretionary (Mak, 1991, pp. 150 – 161). The latest projections by the US Congressional Budget Offices say debt is expected to rise above 90 per cent of GDP by 2020 and to an astonishing 344 per cent by 2050 - a figure that would see the net interest payments become a crippling 85 per cent of revenue (Koo, 2010, pp. 102-138). What if the sudden decline in American power brings to an unexpected end the hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region? Are we ready for such a dramatic change in the global balance of power? A decade of rapid increases in military expenditure have spluttered to a halt, and with US combat forces retreating from Iraq and due to leave Afghanistan from 2014, the mood is ripe for cuts in military spending (Hack & Tobias, R. 2006, pp. 97-124). Even Defence Secretary Robert Gates admitted that the gusher on military expenditure has been turned off and will stay off for a good period of time. According to a report by Washingtons Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the challenge with the global financial crisis will be to streamline US defence spending in to nations such as China, Russia and India (Camilleri, J. 2005, pp. 142-163). Literature review In 2010 the US will spend more than 700 billion dollars on national defence, more than the next 34 highest spending countries in the world combined (Albertson, 2008, pp. 198-231). The western Pacific has the US 7th fleet with more than 50 warships, 350 aircraft and 60,000 marines at its disposal that include 18 permanently forward-deployed warships that operate from Japan and Guam (Combs, 2008, pp. 364-381). But what troubles some Americans is that the naval build-up of China poses a more immediate risk to the naval operations of the US close to the Chinese coast, raising suspicions on the ability of US forces to defend Taiwan. China is making a fundamental strategic move, where they are moving from a focus on their ground forces to focus on their navy, maritime and air force (Doyle, 2007, pp. 128-152. China is pumping several billions of dollars into new warships and submarines with the aim of denying the US Navy the ability to be the supreme ruler in East Asian waters (Roy, 1995, 45 – 60). It has also shown a willingness to scrap with US forces in the region, including the harassment and obstruction of the US naval survey ship by five Chinese vessels in the South China Sea in March 2009. Chinas military behaviour and ambitions, albeit focused relatively close at home, point to nothing less than a bid for geopolitical pre-eminence in East Asia. Some people argue that an essentially stable geostrategic balance exists in East Asia, with the US dominant at sea and China dominant on land. However, this argument misunderstands the challenge that seaward expansion by China poses to the US system of regional security. The greatest concern that the US and the West have is China’s development of an anti-ship missile that has a range of nearly 900 miles, specifically designed to defeat US carrier strike groups (Robinson, 1996, pp. 138-162). Chinas investments in ballistic missiles and anti-ship weapons could threaten Americas primary way to help allies in the Pacific and project power, especially the forward bases and strike carrier groups (Bert, 1993, pp. 317-332). Chinas ambitions in the Pacific are in the meantime limited to denying US forces the ability to operate from forward bases such as Guam and Okinawa, as well as sowing doubts in the minds of Americans about the safety of US carrier groups close to the Chinese mainland (David & Grondin, 2006, pp. 127-149). Some people believe the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have come at the cost of other significant defence programs, such as the decision to cancel the F-22 fighter program - a plane that was considered able to penetrate Chinas increasingly sophisticated air defence systems (Liu, 2006, pp. 93-116). The Obama administration has taken Chinas naval build-up in the region seriously and lately has moved to shore up its alliances in East Asia. The US announced it would resume relations with Kopassus, Indonesias controversial Special Forces, in what is the most significant move yet by the United States to reinforce ties in East Asia as a hedge against Chinas rises. The Obama administration has also taken new steps to strengthen its ties with traditional allies such as Japan, South Korea and Malaysia. The propositions made by America have been received well in a region that is also eyeing Chinas naval expansion. In effect, China now faces the prospect of a extended and revitalised US alliance structure in Asia, which includes a second tier of de facto partners from Asia, which causes fears about Chinas rise as much as the US (Norton et al, 2004, pp. 321-352). The problem with this approach is that the US is not dealing from a position of strength. Suffering from unprecedented peacetime fiscal deficits and imperial overstretch which threaten to erode US military foreign policy clout and capabilities, this barely seems the time for Asian states to put their faith in Uncle Sam (Hsiao, Xiao & Lin, 2009, pp. 236-274). Research methodology and design This study takes a China-centric approach that assesses China’s expansion of its navy and its hegemonic tendencies. Using an approach that only looks into China’s actions today and then assumes what its intentions in present day are could lead to wrong conclusions that are characterised by one’s own frame of reference and biases. In such a case where China’s actions do not seem to correspond with positions that have been publicly stated, it becomes even more crucial to look at the problem with a right lens (Combs, 2008, pp. 186-201). This study therefore uses a historical and textual methodology. It tries to understand China’s naval intent by first investigating how China sees itself in the world and then combining this perspective with its present day actions. The objective is to get the lens through which one could understand China’s clear pronouncements and even know the nature of the rhetoric. Analysis China had used a realist approach to international relations by choosing to use force against its enemies. China also has desire for cultural, economic, and geopolitical pre-eminence. Altogether, imperial China showed hegemonic tendencies. The writings of Chinese leaders and their scholars evidenced the country’s contemporary strategic thinking. This reveals that a realist paradigm exists even today. China’s prefers to balance powers and a world order based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”. All things considered, indications from contemporary strategic thinking point to the conclusion that the strategic intent of China is not hegemony. Since 1979 and particularly since the late 1990s, China has demonstrated that it has increased sophistication in using economic and diplomatic instruments of power in pursuing state interests (Scott, 2007, pp. 129-148). One such economic instrument is China’s navy that it has used instead of force. The main signs of China’s inclination to dominate lie in the pursuit of arms and energy transfer policies (Harrison, 2007, pp. 142-183). Nonetheless, arguing that these policies represent a systematic strategy to achieve hegemony is a stretch. China has made eerie progress on its dogged trek to transition from an obsolete 1950s-style coastal defence force to a balanced blue water fleet (Blamires & Jackson, 2010, pp. 63-91). Numerous factors are in play as China unveils a stable of advanced and emerging systems. The first factor is that China is busy working on a new weapon that will change the strategic calculus, the 1,500-mile range DF-21 ASBM that is specifically designed to destroy US carrier strike groups (Odgaard, 2007, pp. 262-283). The DF-21 will be armed with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MARV) that in combination with a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system will be used to strike moving warships at sea (Murray, 1998, pp. 73-91). This threat is unlike any other that has ever been faced by the US Navy, and the prospect of intercepting a manoeuvring ballistic missile re-entry vehicle is daunting. The second factor is that in 1996 after suffering an embarrassing indignity when President Bill Clinton ordered the Independence and Nimitz carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait, China has embarked on a program aimed at building a powerful surface fleet, which will include aircraft carriers (BBC Monitoring Service, 1997, pp. 78-93). The United States, which is a maritime nation with worldwide responsibilities, devotes only 26 percent of its defence budget to the Navy and Marine Corps (Carpenter, Dorn & Cato Institute, 2000, pp. 137-161). In contrast, the Chinese Navy attracts more than 33 percent of the nation’s military spending. Conclusion The significance of evaluating China’s expansion of its navy and its hegemonic ambitions in an accurate manner deserves reiteration. The developments discussed in this paper do not leave a great deal of room for optimism. The prospect that the US Navy alone will recalibrate the balance of sea power is remote as the United States buckles under the strain of enormous budget deficits. There are only two outcomes to be expected, the first being that China will indeed achieve its goal of becoming the Asian hegemonic power, dominant on both land and the Western Pacific. The second possible outcome is that other nations in the region from Russia to Vietnam will begin to think more overtly about how they can balance the growing power of China and collective measures. References Albertson, M. 2008. Theyll have to follow you: The triumph of the great white fleet. Tate Publishing. BBC Monitoring Service. 1997. Summary of world broadcasts: Asia, Pacific, issues 3012-3024. British Broadcasting Corporation. Bert, W. 1993. Chinese policies and U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. University of California Press, 33(3), 317-332. Blamires, C. & Jackson, P. 2010. World fascism: A historical encyclopaedia, Volume 1. 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