How Peace Led to Civil War in Iraq - Essay Example

Section/# Iraq: A Study of the Failure to Prepare for Peace and how it Lead to Civil War The current situation that is unfolding within the nation of Iraq is not only unfortunate – it is also somewhat predictable. The underlying reason for this has to do with the fact that the failure to prepare for peace and effectively negotiate between elements that would have contributed to this piece was lost over the past decade and has strongly contributed to interethnic, interreligious, and trans regional strife that was already rampant within the Middle East. As a function of discussing and describing this failure to prepare for peace in a more effective manner, the following analysis will utilize historical discussion, at least in terms of the past decade, as a means of prompting the reader to further engage in the understanding that missed opportunities have contributed more to the conflict that is currently taking place within a rock as compared to any other issues. Not only does the paper have a level of relevance in terms of the difficult road to recovery that the nation of Iraq has been attempting to travel upon since the US-led invasion in 2003, it also sheds a valuable light on the ability to draw inference from the ongoing situation with ISIS and the means by which Iraq is currently facing sectarian conflict as a nation; both from within and from external third party factors without. Through such a discussion is the hope of this author that the reader will gain a more informed understanding with respect to what is currently taking place within Iraq but also in terms of the way in which a peace process and constant cooperation and engagement serve as an effective means of ameliorating war and decreasing the likelihood of the situation that is currently exhibited within Iraq. One of the first failures to prepare for peace is in terms of the way in which the United States and its allies overlooked the effect that transition from ruthless dictatorship to parliamentary democracy would take place. Essentially, as Saddam Hussein had a firm and ruthless grasp upon politics within the nation of Iraq, the degree and extent to which certain ethnic groups could be relevant within the process and have their voice heard without fear of repression was extraordinarily limited. Prime example of this can be seen with respect to the way in which Saddam Hussein leverage these sectarian divisions as a means of strengthening his own grasp on power and marginalizing millions of Iraqis. As the United States and its allies defeated Saddam Hussein and the Baath party of Iraq, the difficult part lay ahead of them (Jorgins, 2014). Essentially, the United States and its allies was stated within immediate situation in which repress ethnic groups and minorities immediately wanted to correct many of the wrongs and disparities that have been foisted upon them by Saddam Hussein government for so many years. Virtually unprepared for this level of vitriol and hatred and expecting that the newly “read” individuals would welcome the United States coalition with open arms, a near immediate level of sectarian violence broke out between individuals and groups that felt they had been wronged by the preceding government. Not only was this extraordinarily violent, it also diminished any prospect for the quick establishment of a representative democracy (Mason, 2012). These groups essentially realize the fact that being a minority or sectarian group within Iraqi politics has been directly correlated to being violently repressed against within the past. With this in mind, the desire to integrate with a parliamentary democracy to make it work for all stakeholders involved was drastically increase upon nearly each and every member of Iraqi society. Furthermore, a certain level of blame can be placed upon the way in which the United States and its allies wrongly assumed that the Iraqi people would be so interested in immediately establishing a democracy as a means of facilitating governance. For the most part, this was widely accepted; however, Iraqi opposition to this idea was met with immediate violence which plunged the nation of Iraq into nearly 4 years of active Civil War prior to the United States and its allies being able to normalize the situation once again. It should be noted that even though the United States expended tens of billions of dollars in fighting the war in Iraq, it was ultimately agreements between rival sectarian groups that allow the parliamentary process and move over and was ultimately responsible for ending the violence within the nation (Crowley et al., 2013). Another overlooked issue in terms of failure to prepare for peace has to do with the impact that third-party proxies had upon the Democratic process and the degree and extent to which Iraqis could govern themselves. As a result of a conflict is ultimately violent past with nation of Iran, Shiite minorities within Iraq were utilized by the nation of Iran as a means of destabilizing the United States influence their and seeking to sidetrack and ultimately derail the process of democratizing nation that was taking place. In a similar vein, one of the United States allies within the region, Saudi Arabia, was actively participating in arming Sunni militias and encouraging them to express a further level of resistance against those elements that Iran was funding (Haddad, 2013). Caught in the middle of this, the United States and its allies, interested in building a parliamentary democracy that was ineffective means of governing all people equally, was faced with a regional power struggle that was ultimately impossible to counteract. A further failure towards peace that was exhibited time and time again over the past decade has to do with the overall lack of mediation that took place within the Iraqi parliamentary democracy. Essentially, time and time again, Parliament was dismissed by the Prime Minister and new coalitions were formed, new elections were held, and a new paradigm shift was effective. Not only was this not particularly effective in addressing the underlying issues plaguing the Iraqi political system – it was also extraordinarily harmful to addressing the issues that were currently exhibited within the nation. Ultimately, rather than dealing with these difficult issues and forcing forward movement to take place, the Prime Minister at that time chose instead to promote an alternative path of understanding. In retrospect, this particular approach was disastrous in the effect that it caused individual stakeholders within the Iraqi political process to lose faith within their leaders and parliamentary democracy that had been established was ineffective in addressing the grievances that people were currently suffering from (Pollack, 2013). As faith in the political system was lost, alternative approaches, leaders, and militia groups within individual communities began to have an increasing level of traction for the way in which a new Iraqi state to emerge. Ignoring the fact that this particular path of action was creating an extraordinarily negative situation, the Iraqi government continued upon this course of action for several more years. This ultimately led to the situation that is currently exhibited. Likewise, as much of this analysis has thus far examined, the blame for the failure of preparing for peace cannot solely be laid upon the Iraqi people and/or the Iraqi government. The reason behind this has to do with the fact that the United States and its allies play a very passive role in seeking to mediate between these groups and four and establish a functional parliamentary democracy. For the most part, once the parliamentary elections had taken place, the United States and its allies felt as if the process was one which would carry itself out and ultimately benefit all people equally. However, not realizing the fact that the parliamentary democracy has only been made possible as a result of violence overthrow, the means by which this could effectively be accomplished was much different as compared to other nations around the world. Bringing the situation to its determinant end, the analyst can now understand the means by which sectarian Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish groups are having a decidedly negative impact upon the overall level of integration that the nation of Iraq could otherwise experience. In light of the massive and shocking expansion that Isis has exhibited over the past several months, the failures in the peace process and the oversight of key individuals in preparing this multiethnic and religiously diverse region for self-rule have come to be even further exemplified (Romano, 2014). Although hindsight is of course perfect, a far more effective approach would have been to establish a longer transitional. By which the sectarian conflicts and ended prior to a parliamentary democracy being foisted upon the nation. Ultimately, with no way of understanding that sectarian conflicts have come to an end and leaders had mutually agreed to the fact that a parliamentary democracy were in their best interests, the nation is still under the impression that a level of sectarian strife and ongoing conflict is the norm that should be expected. References Crowley, M., Mourtada, H., Calabresi, M., Newton-small, J., Thompson, M., Vick, K., & Baker, A. (2014). Iraqs Eternal War. (Cover story). Time, 183(25), 28-34. Haddad, F. (2013). Sectarian Relations in Arab Iraq: Contextualising the Civil War of 2006–2007. British Journal Of Middle Eastern Studies, 40(2), 115-138. doi:10.1080/13530194.2013.790289 Jorgins, M. (2014). Who’s to Blame for the ISIS Crisis?. (2014). Newsweek Global, 163(7), 47-51. Mason, T. D. (2012). Ending the War in Iraq: The Third Option. Civil Wars, 14(2), 205-227. doi:10.1080/13698249.2012.679504 Pollack, K. M. (2013). Iraq Faces the Brink Again. Current History, 112(758), 349-355. Romano, D. (2014). Iraqs Descent into Civil War: A Constitutional Explanation. Middle East Journal, 68(4), 547-566. doi:10.3751/68.4.13 Read More