The Massive Government Cover-Up of the Attack on the USS Liberty - Essay Example

The Massive Government Cover-Up of the Attack on the USS Liberty On June 8, 1967 during the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt an American intelligence ship, the USS Liberty, suffered an unprovoked attack at the hands of the Israeli Air Force. A subsequent attack by Israeli torpedoes resulted in over 30 killed and nearly 100 wounded (Central Intelligence Agency, 471). The Israelis claimed it was an accident caused by mistaking the Liberty for an Egyptian warship. A hasty Navy inquiry accepted this explanation and closed the case. However, it has remained one of the most controversial acts of 'friendly fire' in the history of the US military. There were many questions that remained unanswered during the last 40 years, but recently declassified documents and newly uncovered testimony has shed new light on the events surrounding this tragic event. Examining what we know about the reports from the time, and the information that has been made public since, makes a convincing case that the attack was a deliberate action by the Israeli government and resulted in a massive cover-up by the Navy inquiry. The official explanation at the time was that in the heat of battle the Israeli Air Force had misidentified the USS Liberty as an Egyptian vessel. Yet, according to a CIA memo of June 13, 1967, 5 days after the attack, the agency reported that two Israeli Mirage fighters had orbited the Liberty on a reconnaissance flight just six hours before the attack (Central Intelligence Agency, 469). The CIA further reported that the weather was clear, the ship was plainly marked, and had a US flag flying. (Central Intelligence Agency, 470). In addition the Liberty was 200 feet longer than the Egyptian ship and had an Ensign that was clearly visible and appropriately marked. To examine the case of mistaken identity requires that we evaluate what the Israelis knew and when they knew it. The initial air assault took place at 13:58 hours and a second wave occurred at 14:04 (Bregman, 89). These flights consisted of machine gun strafing and napalm, which damaged the deck, antennas, and some communications capability. Israeli tape recordings from that day verify that Colonel Shmuel Kislev, the Commander of Israeli Air Control, knew that it was an American ship by 14:14 hours (Bregman, 89). At 14:26, 12 minutes after they had confirmed it was a US ship, Israeli torpedo boats arrived at the scene. By 14:31, 17 minutes after verifying identification, the Israeli boats had fired 5 torpedoes (Bregman, 89). One of the torpedoes hit the Liberty, killed 25 crewmen, and put the USS Liberty out of commission. Motives for the attack are difficult to ascertain in the aftermath of war. Military and governments sometimes act as organisms with no clearly definable goal. A plausible explanation has been offered that contends Israel feared that the Liberty would intercept sensitive communications regarding their plans to attack Syria's Golan Heights. If the US were alerted to the plan, they might have tried to prevent what Israel perceived as a vital operation. A CIA report identified Defense Minister Moshe Dyan as the Israeli leader that ordered the attack (Brands, 211). Dyan had gambled that Johnson would not fully investigate the incident. According to Brands, Johnson made a minimal effort to investigate the area, but was concerned about alarming the Egyptians or the Russians (212). After Johnson was unable to gather any information from the scene, the Israelis apologized. Not wanting to destroy the fragile alliance with Israel, Johnson accepted the apology and ordered the incident to be kept quiet (Brands, 212). The following day, Israel launched an attack against Syria, which wrapped up the final phase of the Six Day War. There could be little believability that the Israelis were unaware of a major US intelligence ship just off their coast in international waters. It had been in the Mediterranean since June 5 (Joint Chiefs of Staff). The cover story of mistaken identity was so weak, that according to Olson, "[...] most American policymakers believed the attack had been intentional" (277). Ambassador Richard Helms, future director of the CIA, also agreed at the time that the attack was a deliberate attempt to keep the US from knowing what they had planned for Syria (Parker, 257). As a further indication of the validity of this point of view, it should be noted that Israel had warned the US that they were planning to attack Egypt. Yet, they did not alert the US as to their plans in Syria. Secretary of State Dean Rusk also had grave misgivings about the mistaken identity account. In a harshly worded letter to the Israeli government dated June 10, 1967, he stated, "In these circumstances, the later military attack by Israeli aircraft on the USS Liberty is quite literally incomprehensible. The subsequent attack by Israeli torpedo boats, substantially after the vessel was or should have been identified by Israeli military forces..." (qtd. in Catcher). Secretary Rusk maintained this position until his death in 1994. To sink a US intelligence ship would be a brazen move on the part of Israel. It could only be accomplished if they could successfully claim it was an accident, which was not likely to be believed. The Israelis had another plan in the works, and that was to blame Egypt for the attack. Findley reports that the operation called for intense jamming of the airwaves which would make communications impossible. They would then sink the vessel killing all aboard, leaving no witnesses and no evidence. The radio jamming apparently was taking place during the attacks, and throughout the day, as there were several problems communicating with the Liberty during this period (Joint Chiefs of Staff). However, the Liberty was able to get off one distress call for help that was picked up by a US aircraft carrier and also intercepted by the Israelis (Findley). With the US alerted to the attack, the Israelis decided to claim it was an accident, and hope that Johnson would aid in a cover-up. The initial and only true inquiry made by the government was made by the US Navy. The inquiry was done in a rapid manner and defied any sense of thoroughness. One of the Navy's major recommendations was to increase the Navy's strength of second class radiomen (United States Navy). While a domestic airline crash may take up to a year to investigate, the Navy inquiry took just 10 days. The Joint Chiefs wrote a fact-finding paper that was based solely on the Navy's account. In it the Joint Chiefs stated that, "interviews were not conducted under oath", "impact upon Liberty's personnel was held to a minimum", and there were no "communications personnel available that had direct knowledge and reliable power of recall" (Joint Chiefs of Staff). They further stated that no communications or files survived the attack and within three weeks the Joint Chiefs had accepted the Navy's cursory findings. The Legal Counsel for the Navy Court of Inquiry, Captain Ward Boston, has refuted the government's findings and has recently come forward with information about the events at the time. He claims there was government pressure to falsify the report and has since sworn an affidavit in which he claims, "I am certain that the Israeli pilots that undertook the attack, as well as their superiors, who had ordered the attack, were well aware that the ship was American" (Declaration of Ward Boston). To explain his reluctance to come forward with the truth sooner, Boston says, "In military life, you accept the fact that if you're told to shut up, you shut up" (qtd. in Fraser). After examining the facts that surround the attack on the USS Liberty, it is irrational to believe that the tragedy was the result of mistaken identity. The reconnaissance flights six hours before the attack would have certainly identified it as a US ship. The size and clear markings could not have been mistaken. The explanation that it was pilot error in the 'heat of battle' is likewise unbelievable. These were pilots that were trained professionals. They were not under enemy fire at the time and were not being threatened. The fact that almost all senior policymakers agreed that the attack was intentional is a solid foundation to rest a case on. The Navy's shallow inquiry, and the Joint Chiefs' lack of one, is an indication of a massive government cover-up. The legal counsel for the inquiry has admitted his errors, and documents that have been released have verified his accounts of that day. The sinking of the USS Liberty was the one of the largest military tragedies in US peacetime history, and has become the nation's most secret cover-up. Works Cited Brands, H W. The Wages of Globalism : Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power . New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Bregman, Ahorn. Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002. Catcher, James R. "Liberty Victims Did Not Die in Vain." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 131.8 (2005). Thomson Gale. 16 Nov. 2006. Central Intelligence Agency. "Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968." Vol. 19. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. Eds. Harriet D. Schwar and Edward Keefer. Washington, DC: US Government, 1967. 16 Nov. 2006 . "Declaration of Ward Boston, Jr., Captain, JAGC, USN (Ret.)." USSLiberty.org. 8 Jan. 2004. 16 Nov. 2006 . Findley, Paul. "Washington's Fateful Cover-Up of Israel's Attack on the USS Liberty." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 24.6 (2005). Thomson Gale. 16 Nov. 2006. Fraser, Ronald. "Captain Boston's Secret." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 129.7 (2003). Thomson Gale. 16 Nov. 2006. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team USS liberty Incident 8 June 1967. Washington, DC: US Government, 1967. 16 Nov. 2006 . Olson, James S. Historical Dictionary of the 1960s . Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. Parker, Richard B. The Six-Day War : A Retrospective . Gainsville, AL: Gainesville University Press, 1996. United States Navy. Record of Proceedings, Court of Inquiry. Washington, DC: US Government, 1968. 16 Nov. 2006 . Read More